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PANEL I:  Do Overly Broad Patents 
Lead to Restrictions on 
Innovation and Competition? 
947 
Moderator: John Richards∗ 
Panelists: Matthew Bye† 
 Mary Critharis‡ 
 David Balto§ 
 Herbert Schwartz|| 
 
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you, Dean Treanor. 
Our first panel this morning is looking at the question of 
whether overly broad patents promote or harm innovation.  We 
have as our first speaker Mary Critharis from the Patent Office; 
then Matthew Bye from the FTC; then two speakers from private 
practice, David Balto, who is an antitrust lawyer, and Herb 
Schwartz, who is probably the senior performing patent person in 
the City nowadays, right Herb? 
MR. SCHWARTZ: If you say so, yes. 
MR. RICHARDS: I think you probably are. 
They will give both sides of this issue. 
We just celebrated the centenary of the events at Kitty Hawk, 
the first heavier-than-air flight.  Had the Wright brothers secured a 
patent covering any heavier-than-air machine, which they did 
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notif you look at their patents,1 they’re really directed to the nuts 
and bolts of the aircraft—then would that have affected the way in 
which aeronautic development took place in the first part of the 
20th century? 
Today, we have a situation in the biotech area, where some 
very basic and very broad patents are being granted and both sides 
of the question argue very strongly that they are appropriate 
because this is the contribution that people have made.  They made 
a very broad fundamental step forward; and the competition of 
course says, “This is stopping us from doing everything; you’re 
going to have to pay license fees to everybody; it’s going to make 
it prohibitive to make further innovation”and that really, I think, 
is where the nub of the question lies. 
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) had a report come out 
approximately a year ago,2 which has caused a lot of debate and 
concern and interest, and the Patent Trade Organization (“PTO”) 
has started to respond to that. 
Our first speaker this morning is Mary Critharis from the PTO.  
Ms. Critharis is an attorney with the Office of International 
Relations at the US-PTO at the moment.  She was previously an 
examiner, she is, by training, a chemist, and she will say more 
about herself if she wishes to.  Thank you. 
MS. CRITHARIS: Technical issues. 
MR. BALTO: This is the first time, by the way, for everybody 
to see that the FTC and PTO do know how to communicate. 
MS. CRITHARIS: First, I want to thank the organizers of the 
conference, the Journal.  This brings back a lot of memories—
some good, some not so goodfrom days of organizing the 
symposiums when I was in law school, which was a very long time 
ago. 
 
 1 See U.S. Patent No. 821,393 (issued May 22, 1906), available at 
http://invention.psychology.msstate.edu/i/Wrights/WrightUSPatent/WrightPatent.html 
(last visited May 7, 2005). 
 2 FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N [“FTC”], TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE 
OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (Oct. 28, 2003) [hereinafter FTC 
REPORT], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (last visited May 
7, 2005). 
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I’m going to talk a little bit in this initial presentation about 
what the policies and practices are at the US-PTO.  I think that will 
give us a framework for some of the later discussions. 
[Slide]  First, I just wanted to explain that we have seven 
technology centers and that’s how we are organized.3  Most of the 
ones that we will be talking about today will be in the biotech 
group; then there’s the chemical group; there’s a computer 
groupthat’s Group 2100 where a lot of the business method 
patents and the Internet-related patents are examined; there’s a 
communication group; there is a hardware-semiconductors group; 
and there’s a group on transportation and mechanical engineering. 4 
Overall, we have over 3,500 patent examiners.5  To date, 
because this is a little old, we have hired some more examiners.  
So we have approximately 3,700 examiners.6 
[Slide]  Each technology center is divided up into different art 
units.  The art units have a very specific docket where they 
examine cases.  For example in the biotech art unit you may have a 
unit that just does gene therapy patents.  So you can see where it’s 
very specialized.  You may have in the telecommunications art unit 
just printers or something of that nature. 
In that art unit there are about thirteen to eighteen examiners, 
depending on the need for technology, that examine that very 
specific area, with a supervisor in that group. 
[Slide]  Generally, the patent examination process is a back-
and-forth with the applicant and the examiner.  The application is 
submitted to the office, and a lot of times there are claims which 
define the scope of the invention that are presented with the 
application. 
 
 3 See Patent Technology Centers, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/info/pat-tech.htm  (last 
visited May 7, 2005). 
 4 See id. 
 5 See Press Release, United States Patent and Trademark Office [hereinafter 
“USPTO”], Agreement Reached on Patent Telework Program (Jan. 30, 2003), available 
at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/03-02.htm. 
 6 USPTO, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 12 
(Nov. 8, 2004) [hereinafter “USPTO REPORT”],  available at http://www.uspto.gov/ 
web/offices/com/annual/2004/2004annualreport.pdf. 
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Usually what happens is there is a back-and-forth.  The 
examiner might find some prior art.  The applicant may then try to 
amend his claims.  A lot of times applicants do come in with fairly 
broad claims, and then they narrow their scope of protection 
because the examiner has found certain references or certain 
disclosures that may not make it patentable.7 
[Slide]  What I’d like to do is discuss some of the patent 
examination criteria today. 
I just wanted to give you another statistic, the number of 
filings.  We had over 350,000 filings in fiscal year 2004,8 and that 
was 6 percent above fiscal year 2003.9  So we had a little dip 
where in 2003 there wasn’t much growth,10 but applications have 
been growing on average from 5-to-10 percent over the years, and 
we, I think, predict another 5 percent increase in fiscal year 2005. 
Of those applications that are filedand this is preliminary 
because our fiscal year just ended and so the data is not exactly 
accuratebut roughly 170,000 applications are issued.11  But I do 
want to point out that even though that looks like a very high 
number, this is not just applications that issue from the first 
application.  A lot of times continuation applications are filed, 
divisional applications, continuation part type applications.  These 
are new applications that are based from old prosecution, of old 
cases that have been filed a couple of years ago. 
[Slide]  The basis for examination and for protection in the 
United States comes from the Constitution.  Section 8 says: 
Congress shall have power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
 
 7 See USPTO, Frequently Asked Questions, available at http://www.uspto.gov/ 
web/offices/dcom/bpai/bpaifaq.htm (last visited May 15, 2005). 
 8 See USPTO REPORT, supra note 6, at 17. 
 9 See id. 
 10 See generally U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, Calendar Years 1963 – 2003 (showing a 
2.6% increase in patent applications between 2002 and 2003), at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last modified Aug. 31, 
2004). 
 11 See USPTO REPORT, supra note 6, at 17 (reporting that the actual number was 
170,637). 
PANEL I 11/21/2005  10:58 AM 
2005] OVERLY BROAD PATENTS LEAD TO RESTRICTIONS 951 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”12 
Since 1790, we have always had a patent statute.13  The most 
recent amendment to the patent statute, the Patent Act, was in 
1952.14 
[Slide]  These are the statutory requirements that I am going to 
talk about today.  There are some other ones, but I think these are 
the ones that are germane to the discussions that have been set 
forth by the FTC in their review, so I think we’ll focus on these. 
● There is Section 101, which talks about subject matter, what 
is eligible for protection, and also utility.15 
● Then there is Section 102, which talks about novelty.16  We 
use the word “anticipation” in the patent law.  This really means 
that something is new.17 
● Then there is Section 103, which talks about, even if it’s 
new, was it obvious to somebody to have derived that invention.18 
[Slide]  So the first thing is patentable subject matter.  Section 
101 grants protection to those inventions that are new and useful.19  
They have to be either a process, a machine, a manufacture or 
composition of matter, or any improvement thereof.  That really is 
two different categories: we have processes; and machines, 
manufacture, and composition of matter are products.  So we have 
 
 12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8. 
 13 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109–12 (repealed 1793). 
 14 Pub. L. No. 82-593, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 35 U.S.C. (2000)).. 
 15 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 16 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). 
 17 See, e.g., In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1401 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (holding that the 
definition of “new” within patent law should be construed in accordance with the 
provisions of § 102). 
 18 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). 
 19 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title”). 
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process patents and product patents.20  Those are very important 
because they offer different types of protection. 
Generally, though, this is a very broad statement of what is 
eligible for patent protection.  A lot of other countries have a lot of 
different exclusions in their law.21  We do not have any other 
exclusions in our law.  Our law sets forth that any new product or 
process is eligible for protection.22 
That is why Congress has said that anything under the sun 
made by the hand of man is eligible for patent protection.23 
[Slide]  The Supreme Court, though, has articulated three 
categories of subject matter that are not patentable.24  These are 
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.25  These are 
things that really do not meet the criteria of invention because 
these things were out there all along; nobody really invented 
something.  These are laws of nature, whether it be gravity, just 
some abstract idea, natural phenomena, naturally occurring 
products such as a plantyou can’t patent that because it exists; 
you didn’t really do anything. 
So the key is intervention by man, man actually doing 
something with the laws of nature.  Applying electricity or taking 
something from a plant and processing it, that application may be 
patented, but the idea itself, these abstract ideas, are clearly not 
patentable. 
[Slide]  One of the important areas that was briefly touched 
upon in the introduction is biotech inventions.  For a long time, the 
 
 20 See generally id. (stating that an inventor may obtain a patent on “any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . . .”) 
 21 See, e.g., Alison Butler, The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: 
What’s at Stake, 72 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV., No. 6, 34, 36–37 (1990), 
available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/90/11/Intellectual_Nov_ 
Dec1990.pdf  (last visited May 8, 2005) (differentiating the types of patent exclusions in 
industrialized and developing counties by different patentability categories). 
 22 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 23 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 
5 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)). 
 24 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 
584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo 
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)). 
 25 See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185. 
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policy of the US-PTO was not to give patents on naturally 
occurring products.26  A patent application was filed on a 
microorganism, and it went all the way up the Supreme Court, and 
the Supreme Court held that this microorganism was not a 
naturally occurring microorganism, it was the product of man, and 
therefore it could be subject to protection.27 
[Slide]  Now, on business method patents we used to also have 
an exception that business methods were not patentable because 
they were just mathematical formulations, bookkeeping methods; 
they were really just ideas and mental steps.28  However, the 
Federal Circuit in the State Street Bank case29 clearly rejected the 
idea that there is a business method rejection.  The court went on to 
say that all methods should be treated fairly and equally, and as 
long as there is a practical application of that ideathat is, a new, 
useful, and tangible resultit may be patentable.30  It still has to 
meet the other criteria, but we are talking here about whether 
something is just eligible for protection.  The court said that in this 
casethis was a data processing mechanism in a computerit is 
definitely patentable subject matter.31 
[Slide]  So taking our guidance from the Court, we have issued 
patents on various biotech inventions and as well on business 
method and Internet-related inventions. 
[Slide]  Now, once something is eligible for protection, it still 
has to meet the other criteria of utility, novelty, and obviousness. 
I am going to talk briefly about the utility standard, because it 
is very important in the biotech area.  Even though all of our 
requirements are technology-neutral and they apply to all the areas 
 
 26 See generally Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 306 (stating that the Patent Office rejected 
the inventors patent on the grounds that “living things they are not patentable subject 
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”  This position was subsequently affirmed by Patent Office 
Board of Appeals.). 
 27 See id. at 320–21. 
 28 See, e.g., In re Heritage, 150 F.2d 554 (C.C.P.A. 1945); In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165 
(C.C.P.A. 1951) (applying the mental steps doctrine, which precludes from patentability, 
claims that recite purely mental steps). 
 29 See State St. Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 
(Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 30 Id. at 1376. 
 31 Id. 
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of technology, it has specific implications in the biotech area.  That 
is that utility must be: “specific, credible, and substantial.”32 
This is so important in the biotech area because a lot of people 
were just finding different sequences or different DNA sequences 
or little snippets of nucleotides and they didn’t know what they 
were useful for. 
With the Human Genome Project33—I know everyone has 
heard about thatthere are a lot of sequences in the human 
genome.  Many elements of the Project do not necessarily have a 
function.  So you can’t patent something if you don’t know the 
specific utility, that the gene has a very particular function.  That’s 
why the substantial utility and specific utility are very important in 
the biotech area. 
[Slide]  For most other cases, if something has a well-
established utility, it’s known in the art to be used in a certain 
fashion, then that would be acceptable.  For example, if something 
is useful as a coating or adhesive, that is well accepted and that’s 
okay.  You don’t have to establish a more specific utility than that. 
[Slide]  Now I’m going to talk a little bit about novelty.  This is 
the “newness” requirement in our patent law.34  In order for 
somebody to get a patent it must not have been known or used 
before.  There is a very specific set of criteria about what qualifies 
as a printed document or a disclosure.  I’m not going to really go 
into that because I don’t think that is so relevant to our discussion.  
But if somebody did discover this or it was used before, then the 
applicant is pretty much barred from getting a patent on that. 
[Slide]  I think the more relevant requirement here is 
obviousness.35  Where are the obviousness standards set?  I think 
 
 32 See Denise Casey, Gene Patenting Update: U.S. PTO Tightens Requirements, 11 
Human Genome News (Nov. 2000), available at http://www.ornl.gov/ 
sci/techresources/Human_Genome/publicat/hgn/v11n1/HGN11No1_2color.pdf 
(discussing the new rules used to govern patentability of genomic or other 
biotechnological inventions, which were enacted in Dec. 1999). 
 33 See U.S. Dept. of Energy, Human Genome Project Information, at 
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/home.shtml (last visited May 8,  
2005). 
 34 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2005) (setting forth the novelty conditions for patentability). 
 35 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). 
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it’s pretty clear to people when something is known this is the 
same thingthe same application, same processbut when we 
talk about obviousness, we are talking about whether somebody of 
ordinary skill in the art would have been able to derive this 
invention based on what was already known.36 
[Slide]  This is what examiners look at when they go through 
an obviousness determination.  They look at the scope and content 
of the prior art.  The prior art are the references, things like known 
patents and printed publications.37  They ascertain the differences 
between the new art and the prior art.  They have to look at what 
the ordinary skill in the art is; that’s very important because you’re 
not just talking about the knowledge of a lay person, you’re talking 
about somebody skilled in the art.  The examiners then consider 
the evidence that is presented. 
I do want to point out that there is a lot of case law surrounding 
obviousness.38  If somebody has a certain widget and someone 
makes it a little bigger, the case law says it would have been 
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to vary the size of certain 
components.39  In the computer area, we also have that mere 
automation of a known function would have been obvious.40  So 
for things like that we have certain standards that we have used in 
determining obviousness. 
[Slide]  I’m going to talk a little bit about post-grant measures 
because there’s a lot of criticism about this.  You know, we do 
issue a lot of patents and sometimes patents get out there that the 
examiner missed some prior art. 
 
 36 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). 
 37 See USPTO, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, § 2142 (8th ed. 2001) 
[hereinafter USPTO MANUAL, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/ 
mpep/documents/2100_2142.htm. 
 38 See generally Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Application and Effect of 35 U.S.C.A. § 
103, Requiring Nonobvious Subject Matter, In Determining Validity of Patents, 23 
A.L.R. Fed. 326 (2004) (indexing numerous cases and issues surrouding the statutory 
requirement of non-obviousness). 
 39 See generally American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 
1354 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding that, among other differences, a mere change in size was 
insufficient to distinguish an invention from prior art). 
 40 See Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 228–30 (1976); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 
594–95 (1978); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 209–220 (1981) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); 69 C.J.S. Patents § 81 (2003). 
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They did a thorough search, but it’s very difficult to search 
through all the volumes of all the databases and books to 
necessarily come up with something. 
And in some art, it’s difficult to really do searching.  In the 
sequence art, sequences can be hundreds of pages long.  In the 
chemical structure art, the chemical structure can be very 
complicated.  And in the business method and Internet-related art, 
there are not a lot of publications, not organized as well as in the 
chemical arts where all structures are published very 
systematically. 
[Slide]  So we do have reexamination proceedings, reissue 
proceedings, and we are also considering post-grant opposition 
proceedings. 
Reexamination is a proceeding where either the patent owner 
or a third party can request that the PTO reexamine an application 
in light of new art that wasn’t considered by the examiner during 
the first go-around.41  So a third party may find a piece of prior art 
that demonstrates “this was clearly known; I want the Patent Office 
to revisit it.” 
There are two kinds of reexamination.  There is ex parte and 
there is inter partes. 
Inter partes is a very new form of reexamination that was 
established in 1999.42  It hasn’t been used very much.43  Here the 
third party can file a request with the Patent Office and have some 
level of participation in the reexamination process.  I think the 
reason why it hasn’t been utilized is because there are some issues 
regarding issue preclusion.  Once the PTO has made a 
determination, you are precluded from appealing it in court and 
bringing up those issues that you could have raised in the 
 
 41 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–303 (2000); see also Association of Patent Law Firms, PTO: 
New Guidelines For Previously-Considered Prior Art In Reexamination Proceedings 
(June 8, 2003) (discussing recent changes to the Patent Reexamination Guidelines which 
allow reliance on “old art”), available at http://www.aplf.org/mailer/issue86.html. 
 42 USPTO, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION (2004), Executive 
Summary, available  at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/reports/reexam 
report.pdf (last visited May 8, 2005). 
 43 See USPTO REPORT, supra note 6, at 129, Table 13B (showing that only 27 inter 
partes applications were filed in 2004). 
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reexamination.44  So I think a lot of third parties are afraid to rely 
on it, so we really have had few instances of inter partes 
reexamination. 
But just to give you an idea, of the 170,000 applications that 
we granted, we have roughly, on average, 300-to-400 
reexaminations a year.45  So you can see it’s a fairly small number 
in comparison to how many applications we see annually. 
“Reissue” is only used by the applicant if he wants to change 
the scope of the patent.46  He finds a piece of prior art and says, “I 
really need narrower protection.  I don’t have the right to get such 
broad protection.”  So he can bring a proceeding with the US-PTO. 
Post-grant opposition proceeding is something that we don’t 
have now but we are considering.  It was recommended in the FTC 
report.47  It is something that, again, would have to come in the 
statutory form.  But we are looking at trying to come up with 
different alternatives and different ways to have a really full-blown 
opposition proceeding at the PTO.  It would likely involve quasi-
discovery or some evidentiary level.  There would be a 
determination where parties can come in and really bring an action 
against the patent on more than just prior art. 
[Slide]  In closing, I just want to point out some critical things. 
The USPTO does not really make the law.  We take our 
direction on what to patent, what the scope of patentable subject 
matter is, from Congress and the courts.48  In doing so, though, we 
do try to implement these policies in a way to foster and encourage 
investment, innovation, development, and research. 
Our patent system is technology-neutral, so the same rules have 
to apply across the board.  This is part of our international 
 
 44 Susan Perng Pan, Considerations for Modifying Inter-Partes Reexam and 
Implementing Other Post-Grant Review, 45 IDEA 1, 9 (2004) (noting that estoppel 
provisions may ward off inter partes reexaminations). 
 45 See USPTO REPORT, supra note 42, at 5. 
 46 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000). 
 47 See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at Executive Summary, 7–8. 
 48 See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 100–105 (2000) (defining the legislative bounds of 
patentable subject matter). 
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obligations.49  We are not allowed to treat different areas 
differentlyI know people have talked about shorter terms of 
protection in the biotech or in the business method area, but that is 
something we are precluded from doing.50 
We continue to revisit new situations and adapt policy 
principles, the principles that have come through Congress, as far 
as having broad subject matter protection, as we see new 
categories of inventions always coming.  We have bioinformatics, 
we have nanotechnology coming down the pike, and we are always 
trying to incorporate the past principles to new technologies. 
Thank you very much. 
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you, Mary.  That gives us the 
background on which to proceed with the rest of this morning’s 
discussion. 
Our next speaker is Matthew Bye, who is from the Office of 
General Counsel of the FTC.  He has carried out hearings in the 
business method area showing what is appropriate in terms of 
patent protection51 and will give us the FTC’s view as to where we 
are in that area and what, if anything, needs to be done about it. 
MR. BYE: Thank you. 
I’m going to talk today about the report that we issued in 2002, 
which is on competition and patents.52 
Before I go on, I just want to point out that the views I express 
today are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the 
Commission or any individual Commissioner. 
[Slide]  The subject of our report was how to promote 
innovation.  Innovation is critical to the U.S. economy, critical to 
 
 49 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) 
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 50 See TRIPS Agreement art. 27. 
 51 See Transcript, FTC/DOJ Hearings on the Implications of Competition and Patent 
Law and Policy, Transcript, 4 (April 11, 2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020411trans.pdf. 
 52 See FTC REPORT, supra note 2. 
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getting many life-saving and other technologies to people across 
the country. 
Both patents and competition can provide innovation.  They do 
it in slightly different ways.  What is most important is that the two 
policies work together in a proper balance to maximize innovation. 
[Slide]  What’s also important is that competition and patents 
often work well together.  The antitrust agencies don’t presume 
market power from a patent, and you can see, throughout the 
economy, firms compete in the sale of patented goods all the time. 
[Slide]  So you might ask: What’s the problem?  Well, in 2002 
we held hearings, and we held them over about thirty days.53  We 
had hundreds of panelists, from patent lawyers, patent academics, 
business experts, a whole range of representatives from patent law 
organizations.  Many of them came to us and expressed a concern 
about poor-quality patents. 
What’s vitally important here is I’m talking about poor-quality 
patents that have economic significance.  So every now and then 
you will see a press article about some sort of amusing patent that 
got issued, a peanut butter and jelly sandwich patent or something 
like that.54  We are not talking about those because they do not 
really have any economic significance at all. 
I have some testimony from the AIPLA stating that “large and 
small companies are increasingly being subjected to litigation or its 
threat on the basis of questionable patents.”55 
[Slide]  I want to talk quickly about two industries that are 
relevant today.  But before I go on, I want to mention Chapter 
 
 53 See generally FTC/DOJ Hearings to Focus on the Implications of Competition and 
Patent Law and Policy (January 30, 2002) (setting forth the initial hearing schedule), at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/01/iphearings.htm. 
 54 Sara Schaefer Munoz, Patent No. 6004596: Peanut Butter and Jelly Sandwich, 
WALL ST, J., April 5, 2005, at B1. 
 55 United States Patent and Trademark Office Fee Modernization Act of 2003: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, The Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 13 (2003) (statement of Michael K. Kirk, 
Executive Director, American Intellectual Property Law Association), available at 
http://www.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/Legislative_Action/108th_Congress1/Testi
mony2/Testimony_on_Fee_Legislation.htm. 
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Three of our report56, which discusses innovation in a whole range 
of industries, looking at pharmaceuticals, biotech, semiconductors, 
and computer software.57 
We had businesses come in from the pharmaceutical industry 
that essentially said that they would not have their industry without 
patents and they are a crucial driver of innovation.  And then in 
other industries, such as software, there was a more mixed view.  
Many of the companies said, “We really don’t feel that patents are 
a spur to innovation.” 
Anyway, in the computer hardware industry, one of the 
problems identified by panelists were patent thickets. 58  That’s a 
situation where you have so many patents that you have this 
unavoidable overlap.59  One statistic we were given is there are 
420,000 semiconductor patents held by about 40,000 parties.60  So 
whenever you want to try to bring a new product to market, there 
can be many complications in terms of identifying all those parties 
and obtaining licenses.  Then if you bring your product to market 
and suddenly someone enforces a patent, you can be liable for 
significant damages. 
There are a few reasons why we are seeing this patent thicket 
develop. 
● One is that the technology in this industry is largely 
incremental.  We don’t often have large, breakthrough innovation.  
Each new innovation builds on the next. 
● One of the ways that companies have responded to this 
problem is to essentially seek as many patents as they possibly 
 
 56 See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at ch. 3. 
 57 See id. at ch. 3, pp. 4, 15, 30, 44. 
 58 “Patent thicket” is a term attributed to a common problem that occurs when a new 
developer seeks to patent a complex invention that incorporates many already-patented 
components.  In essence, the problem is that the patent applicant must seek cross-licenses 
from those who already hold patents to the components.  For a discussion of “patent 
thickets,” see generally JAMES BESSEN, PATENT THICKETS: STRATEGIC PATENTING OF 
COMPLEX TECHNOLOGIES, at http://www.researchoninnovation.org/thicket.pdf  (last 
visited May 9, 2005). 
 59 See id. 
 60 See Transcript, FTC/DOJ Hearings on the Implications of Competition and Patent 
Law and Policy, Transcript, 667–68 (April 28, 2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020228ftc.pdf. 
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can,61 so if a company comes to sue them, they can essentially say, 
“We’re now going to sue you back with these patents.”  So that’s 
where we see this concern of the rise of defensive patenting. 
Other panelists also suggested that the ease of obtaining patents 
at the PTO was contributing to the thicket. 
[Slide]  As a result, you see extensive portfolio cross-licensing 
and defensive patenting throughout the industry.62 
Similarly, the software and Internet industry is premised on 
incremental innovation.63  Some panelists said there was 
uncertainty from the alleged lack of an effective disclosure 
requirement.64  They suggested that the source code should 
actually be disclosed to the PTO, rather than publishing the idea at 
a more abstract level.65 
Other panelists have talked about claim construction 
difficulties.  I just want to note an amicus brief that the PTO, 
Justice Department, and FTC recently submitted to the Federal 
Circuit on the issue of claim construction,66 essentially looking at 
how words in a patent claim should be interpreted, whether they 
should use a dictionary or examine the context of the patent and try 
to illuminate your interpretation from that.67  The agencies 
collectively advocated looking more at the context of the patent 
rather than just taking a very literal, sort of dictionary approach.68 
 
 61 See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at Executive Summary, 6–7 (describing the 
pratice of defensive patenting) . 
 62 See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at ch. 3, pp. 34–44.  Defensive patenting is a practice 
in which inventors (normally large firms) obtain patents to discourage infringement suits 
by raising patent infringement counterclaims. Id. at ch. 3, p. 36.  Cross-licensing is used 
to resolve this impasse whereby the potential infringers agree to license their respective 
technology to the other. Id. at ch. 2, p. 30. 
 63 See id. at ch. 3, p. 30. 
 64 See id. at ch. 3, p. 53. 
 65 See id. at ch. 3, p. 49. 
 66 Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae, United States Patent and Trade Mark Office 
et al., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 375 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1269) (order 
granting rehearing en banc), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ 
com/sol/ambriefs/Phillips_03-1269.pdf (last visited May 9, 2005). 
 67 Id. at 2. 
 68 Id. at 9–15 (arguing that the claim construction should primarily consider intrinsic 
evidence rather than rely solely on standard dictionary definitions); see also Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae United States Patent and Trade Mark Office et al., 
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Patent thickets are a problem in software, as is defensive 
patenting.  Companies are seeking patents to use as bargaining 
chips, and it can increase the cost of entry.  One of the companies 
essentially came to us and said that it’s allocating funds to people 
obtaining patents rather than spending money on research, simply 
so he can defend the company.  He estimated that he took about 25 
percent away from his research budget to increase the number of 
patent filings. This was done, he said, with no benefit to 
innovation.69 
[Slide]  So clearly questionable patents are part of the problem.  
What are they?  Well, they are patents that are likely invalid or 
overbroad. 
A critical thing to note here is that, on the whole, the patent 
examiners at the PTO do a superb job.  As Mary mentioned, they 
are flooded with nearly 1,000 patents a day.  They have roughly 
eight-to-twenty-five hours to read an application, investigate prior 
art, correspond with the parties, and ultimately make a decision.  
Some of these applications can include thousands and thousands of 
pages.  So in the time they are given they do a very superb job. 
But, inevitably, you have questionable patents trickling 
through.  These harm innovation and competition in a number of 
ways.70 
The best thing to think about is the situation where you have a 
small biotech company that wants to do research in an area and 
they see a questionable patent that stands in the way.  They have a 
few choices: 
● They can simply avoid the area, just not engage in any 
research, and then the economy loses because we are not getting 
R&D that we would otherwise have had.71 
 
Phillips v. AWH Corp., __ F.3d __, 2005 WL 1620331 (Fed. Cir. 2005). (largely 
adopting the view for which the Agencies advocated) available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/ambriefs/Phillips_03-1269.pdf. 
 69 See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at ch. 2, pp. 30–31 (discussing how to promote 
innovation through the balancing of competition with patent law and policy). 
 70 See id. at Executive Summary, p. 8. 
 71 See Symposium, Patent Rights and Licensing, 6 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 3, para. 52 
(2000) (“There is empirical evidence that the smaller start-ups with less financial 
resources direct their research in such a way that they avoid fields crowded with many 
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● They could go to the company and seek a license, but then 
they are paying for something that really they should not be paying 
for, so you have funds being diverted from R&D. 
● They can’t challenge the validity of the patent unless they 
have been threatened with infringement. 
So it can be very difficult for some of these companies, 
particularly when they are small, to navigate around some 
questionable patents. 
[Slide]  What are the solutions for this?  Well, as a theoretical 
solution, we have the “but for” test.  I can’t emphasize enough that 
this is a theoretical solution.  It is not one that is meant to apply to 
specific cases. 
Patents have a cost as a means of fostering innovation, but so 
do other mechanisms.  If you think of trade secrecy, when 
companies use trade secrecy they don’t disclose, and so other 
companies lose out from the very important patent disclosures that 
we get. 
The “but for” test essentially involves asking: would the 
innovation occur absent the patent? If it would occur, then it is 
better off being spurred by competition and that patent essentially 
is unnecessary.72 
[Slide]  Practical approaches.  In our report we make ten 
recommendations and I also point out the National Academy of 
Sciences released a report earlier this year, “A Patent System for 
the 21st Century.”73  It’s available on-line, as is our report.  It 
makes six key recommendations, some of which overlap with 
ours.74 
[Slide]  Our first recommendation, as Mary mentioned, was to 
establish a PTO administrative procedure for challenging patents, 
 
patents . . .”); see also S. Benjamin Pleune, Trouble with the Guidelines: On Urging the 
PTO to Properly Evolve with Novel Technologies, 2001 U.ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 365, 
367–68 (discussing the effects of broad patent protection on genetic research) (2001). 
 72 See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at ch. 1, pp. 10–11. 
 73 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L. ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter NAS Report], available at 
http://www.nap.edu/html/patentsystem/0309089107.pdf (last visited May 9, 2005). 
 74 Compare id. at 81 with FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at Executive Summary, 7–15. 
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essentially to weed out some of these invalid and overbroad patents 
we are seeing.75 
Litigation is very expensive and very time-consuming.  Some 
biotech companies estimated it can cost between $3 million and $5 
million and take a number of years.76 
NAS makes a recommendation on this same topic,77 and quite 
recently Representatives Berman and Boucher introduced a bill 
into the House which attempts to outline or describe what such a 
system would look like.78 
[Slide]  There are a few basic requirements for this sort of 
system: It has to address important issues of patentability.  They 
have to control costs, prevent patent holders from being abused by 
frivolous suits, and keep it timely.79  How do you juggle all these 
things?  Well, that is really the catch.  The devil is in the details 
and it is something that needs to be worked out. 
I will just give one example here.  We co-sponsored a 
conference in April in Berkeley.80  The question was raised, how 
long after a patent is issued could you seek reexamination?  The 
people from biotech companies said, “We think nine months is a 
good amount of time,” because they feel that they can identify a 
problematic patent quite quickly, and they want certainty most of 
all.  On the other hand, people from the semiconductor industry 
said, “The patents we have a problem with tend to take three-to-
four years to surface, often after we have issued products, and so 
we need a much longer timeframe.”  It’s just one example of some 
of the difficulties we face in implementing this type of review. 
[Slide]  Moving on to our sixth recommendation: consider 
possible harm to competition along with other possible benefits 
and costs before extending the scope of patentable subject matter.81 
 
 75 See FTC, supra note 2, at Executive Summary, 7–8. 
 76 See id. at Executive Summary, 8. 
 77 See NAS Report, supra note 73, at 82. 
 78 H.R. 5299, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 79 See FTC, supra note 2, at Executive Summary, 7–8. 
 80 See Ideas Into Action: Implementing Reform of the Patent System, 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/patentreform (last visited May 16, 2005). 
 81 Id. at Executive Summary, 14. 
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Over the last two decades, we have seen patentable subject 
matter expand.  We have seen patents issued on biotech and 
software and business method patents.  This is essentially very 
similar to the “but for” test.82  However, before patentable subject 
matter is extended, we want to look at whether we really need 
patents in the particular area or whether the innovation will occur 
regardless. 
[Slide]  There are a few issues with this.  As Mary mentioned, 
there is the Supreme Court precedent, “anything under the sun that 
is made by man is patentable.”83  There are obviously questions at 
the margins here, but that’s one factor to consider. 
Another one is where and when such a debate should take 
place.  The PTO often receives patent applications on new 
technologies.  They sort of trickle in and they might increase over 
time.  It’s not often that a bright light goes on and says “this is now 
patentable,” so there is not always a clear point in time to have this 
debate.  And also, when we do have such a debate, we need to 
have enough information to ask the “but for”84 question: what 
would happen if we didn’t issue patents on this area? 
[Slide]  Moving on to our tenth recommendation, which is to 
expand consideration of economic learning and competition policy 
concerns in patent law decision-making.85  This idea is not 
something that we intend to be applied by the individual examiner 
in the PTO.  It’s more in the formation of rules, something that the 
courts could consider and that the PTO could consider when they 
are issuing guidelines.  It’s also something for Congress to 
consider.  It is important to consider because we need to ensure 
that competition is not unnecessarily displaced. 
 
 82 See id. at ch. 4, pp. 6–8.  The “but for” test is an alternative analysis of patentability 
that considers the competitive effects of the patent.  Rather than inquiring into whether 
the statutory requirements are met, the test asks whether the the innovation would have 
occurred as soon as it did in the absence of patent rights. Id. 
 83 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 84 See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 4, pp. 6–8 (stating that the “but for” test cannot 
practically be applied in the cases of individual patents given the availability and costs of 
the necessary information, but may be applicable in establishing general policies). 
 85 See id. at Executive Summary, 17. 
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[Slide]  There is a lot going on in the area of patent law reform 
at the moment.  Coming up next year, the NAS, AIPLA, and FTC 
will co-sponsor a series of town meetings to discuss patent reform 
in four cities across the country.86  They will essentially involve 
someone making a presentation about a particular area, followed 
by a back-and-forth discussion with the audience—so stay tuned 
for that. 
Then, also look for the bill that was recently introduced.87  It 
will be reintroduced in the next congressional session.88 
Our report, as I mentioned, is available on-line.89  Otherwise, if 
you would like to give me your card or email address, I’ll happily 
send it to you. 
Thanks for your time. 
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you, Matthew. 
Our next speaker will be David Balto to take it from the 
antitrust perspectiveat least that’s what his background is.  I 
don’t know if he is going to speak purely on antitrust, on how the 
need for competition impinges on what we should be doing in the 
patent system. 
MR. BALTO: Just so all of you know, I am in an adversarial 
position.  I get to wear this [Red Sox baseball cap].  Somebody at 
the airport said to me, “Wait till next year.”  I said back to him, 
“I’ve been saying that for the last eighty-five years.” 
I want to thank the people who put this program together.  I 
know how hard they worked at it.  And I know from reading past 
issues of the Journal what a terrific journal it is, and I can only say 
that I am disappointed that I am not on the Janet Jackson panel. 
 
 86 See Agenda for Town Meeting of Patent Reform, at http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/ 
workshops/patenttownmeetings/townmeetingsagenda.pdf (providing schedules for each 
of the Town Meetings) (last visited May 9, 2005). 
 87 H.R. 5299, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 88 As of April 17, 2005, the legislation was embodied in a discussion draft being 
circulated among the House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property.  A copy of the draft 
is available at http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/DraftPatentStatuteDDC.pdf (last 
visited May 16, 2005). 
 89 See FTC REPORT, supra note 2. 
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I wanted to say at the outset I am requiredjust how Matt has 
to give a disclaimerto give an advertisement for my law firm 
whenever I speak.  We’re a terrific law firm.  We were named IP 
Litigation Firm of the Year last year.90 
I am here to tell you that antitrust and IP are at odds.  
Regardless of what any of these people tell you about how they 
serve similar masters and seek similar goals, these things are at 
odds.  I am here to tell you that the scales are not balanced at this 
time. 
Imagine a house that is broken-down and threadbare, lost and 
ignored, and in the backyard there is a big, weedy thicket.  Well, 
the FTC report sort of suggests what you might do with parts of the 
thicket, to trim it down, but there are a lot of things running amok 
in the house at the same time.91 
The pinnacle, to me, of how companies thought that IP rights 
gave then unfettered ability to abuse the antitrust laws was a point 
that Microsoft made in their litigation against the Department of 
Justice.92  They suggested that their tying arrangements were 
justified, and in fact, immune from antitrust scrutiny because they 
had a copyright over Internet Explorer.93 
How did the conservative en banc D.C. Circuit respond to this? 
It held, “Microsoft’s primary copyright argument borders on the 
frivolous.  The company claims an absolute and unfettered right to 
use its intellectual property as it wishes.”94  It also quoted the 
Microsoft brief: “If intellectual property rights have been lawfully 
acquired, their subsequent exercise cannot give rise to antitrust 
liability.”95 
 
 90 See Firm News, The American Lawyer and IP Law & Business Names Robins, 
Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P. “IP Litigation Department of the Year”, at 
http://rkmc.com/firm_news.asp?newsId=185 (last visited May 16, 2005). 
 91 See FTC REPORT, supra note 2 at Executive Summary, 10–20 (setting forth 
recommendations designed to, among other goals, reduce the preclusive effect of patent 
thickets). 
 92 U.S. v. Microsoft Co. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 93 Id. at 63. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. (quoting Appellant’s Opening Br. at 105 (Nos. 00-5212 and 00-5213). 
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Let me tell you, if that was true, in a couple years none of you 
would ever have to take an antitrust course.  Fortunately, it is not 
true.  As the D.C. Circuit said: “That is no more correct than the 
proposition that the use of one’s personal property, such as a 
baseball bat, cannot give rise to tort liability.”96 
As the Federal Circuit succinctly stated: “Intellectual property 
rights do not confer a privilege to violate the antitrust laws.”97 
Now, what Matt didn’t tell you is that there are two parts to this 
story.  That’s sort of like the way that Red Sox fans always 
feelyou know, there’s the first part and then there’s the second 
part that never comes.  But there are two parts to this story. 
The first part was the wonderful report that he has talked about.  
The executive summary is in your materials. 
But there is a second report.  It has not been issued.  Every 
morning we energetic antitrust people, who know that antitrust 
stands there as the vanguard to protect you from the abuse of 
intellectual property rights, wake up, run to our computers, check 
the FTC website, and go, “Where is that report, the second report, 
which deals with how do the antitrust laws need to be reformed, 
how do the antitrust laws need to be enforced, to protect against 
that problem that Matthew has described?”  But look as we might, 
we can’t seem to find that report. 
But if we really want to do more than just take care of the 
weeds in the backyard, we need to see what kinds of actions can be 
taken by antitrust enforcers to set appropriate limits on intellectual 
property rights. 
You know, the law is clear in this area: you have a right as a 
patent holder to exercise your patent monopoly, but you don’t have 
a right to go beyond that patent monopoly and abuse the antitrust 
laws. 
All of you who have taken patent law know that there is a 
doctrine known as inequitable conduct,98 that if you engage in 
 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. (quoting In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 
2000)). 
 98 See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 
1049 (2d ed. 1998). 
PANEL I 11/21/2005  10:58 AM 
2005] OVERLY BROAD PATENTS LEAD TO RESTRICTIONS 969 
patent misuse,99 if you defraud the Patent Officeand we now 
obviously know there is ample opportunity for thatif you engage 
in some type of inequitable conduct, your patent may be declared 
invalid.100  But such actions also can be attacked under the antitrust 
laws. 
So what I wanted to do is just give you some examples of 
enforcement actions taken by the FTC involving efforts by patent 
owners to get a little bit more out of their patent than they really 
were supposed tothese people abused the patent system or other 
regulatory systems.  These examples demonstrate why we need, 
not only reform of the patent system, but aggressive antitrust 
enforcement.  That is the second volume of the report, Matt, if I 
haven’t mentioned that already: to properly reset the balance 
between IP and antitrust law. 
Many of these enforcement actions, by the way, involve the 
pharmaceutical industry.101  Years ago when I was a young 
attorney at the Federal Trade Commission, we were doing 
investigations of a drug company.  They had such a fragile 
understanding of the antitrust laws and of their obligations under 
the those laws, and they were rather brazen in their internal 
documents in describing the types of anticompetitive conduct that 
they planned to engage in than other types of firms. 
The documents were striking.  You would never find them in a 
well counseled company. 
One of these documents we came up with was this nine-step 
plan by four branded pharmaceutical companies.  It outlined efforts 
that they could take to go and expand and protect their patents, or 
protect their monopoly after their patents expired. 
So what were a couple of these strategies that led to important 
FTC enforcement actions? 
 
 99 See Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Hass Co., 448 U.S. 176, 179–80 (1980); see 
also CHISUM, supra note 98 at 1066. 
 100 See CHISUM, supra note 98, at 1049. 
 101 See FTC, FTC ANTITRUST ACTIONS IN PHARMACEUTICAL SERVICES AND PRODUCTS 
(Oct. 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/0410rxupdate.pdf (listing numerous 
enforcement actions brought by the FTC against pharmaceutical firms). 
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The first one was deceptive patent filings and filings before the 
Food and Drug Administration.102  The Hatch-Waxman Act103 sets 
this incredibly complicated gauntlet for generic firms to effectively 
enter into the market.  Basically, this gauntlet provides for 
litigation between branded firms and generic.104 
Anyway, one of the things that you have to do when you are a 
branded firm is list your patent in an FDA book called the Orange 
Book.105  Bristol-Myers came up with the strategy that, at the point 
that the patent would expire, they would return to the Patent 
Office, the very busy Patent Office, and say, “Here’s this patent 
application.  Please approve it.  We need it right away.”106  And the 
Patent Office, of course, looking very diligently and very carefully 
at the application, would automatically approve it.  The FDA 
would then automatically list the patent in the Orange Book.  That 
prevented generic firms from being able to enter the market 
because of statutory requirements that said if a patent was listed in 
the Orange Book, you couldn’t enter for an additional thirty 
months.107 
 
 102 See Examining Issues Related to Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: A 
Review of the FTC Report, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th 
Cong. 36–38 (2002) (statement of Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Federal Trade 
Commission describing how some pharmaceutical companies have abused the parameters 
of the Hatch-Waxman Act to secure greater profits), available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/action/107-140.pdf (last visited May 9, 2005). 
 103 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §355 (2000); 35 U.S.C. §§ 
156, 271, 282 (2000)).  The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 
1984 is commonly known as The Hatch-Waxman Act.  The Hatch-Waxman Act 
encourages generics to enter the market by providing the following benefits to generic 
manufacturers: (1) the filing of an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA); (2) the 
right to test the generic version of a drug before the expiration of the brand name patent; 
and (3) receipt of 180 days of exclusivity for being the first generic on the market. Id. §§ 
101, 202. 
 104 See id. 
 105 Electronic Orange Book of Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence 
Evaluations, at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/default.htm (last visited May 9, 2005). 
 106 See, e.g., Francesca Lunzer Kritz, Why You Still Can’t Buy Cheaper Generics, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2001, at F2.  The BuSpar patent was a day from expiring when the 
FDA issued the new patent to Bristol-Myers. See id. 
 107 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000). 
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Bristol-Myers figured out a perfect way to game this strategy, 
and so they did, until one day the FTC, the states, and lots of 
private attorneys brought antitrust actions against them.108  
Ultimately, Bristol-Myers settled the case, paying substantial 
damages.109 
So that’s the first thing: Is there some way we can go and 
manipulate the patent and regulatory system to extend a patent life 
that actually is supposed to end? 
Second strategy: Well, let’s say you really can’t get the 
regulators involved and you don’t really feel like defrauding the 
Patent Office.  What you can do is find other ways of abusing the 
regulatory structure. 
Now, there is this aspect of the regulatory structure that says 
that the first generic to file a challenge to a patent has the exclusive 
right to enter the market for six months. 
The brand-name firms recognized, “why don’t we just enter 
into a deal with that first generic firm and we’ll settle our patent 
litigation; we will just agree that they won’t enter the market and 
we will pay them, and that is what our settlement will be.”110 
Now, all of you who are students know that you settle patent 
litigation and typically what happens is that the alleged infringer 
pays the patent holder because that’s the way things should work, 
because maybe the alleged infringer really doesn’t have a right to 
enter the market.  But the way these arrangements worked, the 
patent holder paid the alleged infringer; the brand-name firm paid 
the generic firm.111 
The FTC saw this as a guise for two firms going in, splitting 
monopoly profits, and creating a new barrier to entry and 
 
 108 See Melody Peterson, Bristol-Myers Held Culpable in Patent Move Against Rivals, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2002, at C1; see also In re Buspirone Patent and Antitrust Litig., 
185 F. Supp. 2d 363, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 109 See Melody Peterson, Bristol-Myers Squibb to Pay $670 million to Settle Numerous 
Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2003, at C9. 
 110 See, e.g., In re Buspirone, 185 F. Supp. at 366 (alleging that Bristol Meyers Squibb’s 
settlement with Schein Pharmaceuticals was a pretense whereby Bristol Meyers paid 
Schein to keep a generic version of Buspirone off the market). 
 111 See id. 
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effectively extending the patent life.112  You know, the patent 
would have ended at some point, but by going and entering into 
this arrangement they were able to abuse the patent rights and 
effectively extend their patent. 
So let me just leave it with those two examples because I want 
to hear from Herb, who is a lifelong Yankees fan, and I’m sure will 
not agree with any of my points. 
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you, David. 
Herb Schwartz, a partner at Fish and Neave, as I said, the 
premier patent lawyer in the City these days. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: Good morning.  Actually, I happen to be a 
Brooklyn Dodgers fan.  I grew up in the shadow of Ebbets Field.  I 
must admit when the Dodgers were moved out of Brooklyn by 
Walter O’Malley, I decided baseball was a business.  I felt robbed, 
cheated, and raped, and really, sort of my interest in baseball was 
never quite the same.  My wife happens to be a Red Sox fan, and I 
just go to sleep when these games go on now.  But hopefully 
they’ll bring the Dodgers back to Brooklyn someday and I can 
really reassert my interest in the whole thing.  So as far as baseball, 
those are my views. 
As far as the FTC report and the subject of today, I have 
trouble with the basic thesis that the FTC uses.  I don’t think it 
makes any sense.  Let me explain what I mean. 
The basic thesis of the FTC is that there is something called a 
questionable patent.113  They say that a questionable patent is a 
patent that is “[a] poor quality or questionable patent”114 and it is 
either “likely invalid or contains claims that are likely 
overbroad.”115 
Now, I’ve spent a fair amount of time involved in patent 
litigation and teaching patent law and I know a little bit about the 
statutes, and you have heard about them this morning.  There are 
provisions in the patent laws for novelty, usefulness, 
 
 112 See Peterson, supra note 108, at C1, C19. 
 113 See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at Executive Summary, 9. 
 114 Id. at Executive Summary, 5. 
 115 Id. 
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unobviousness.116  I have never seen a provision that deals with a 
questionable patent; I have never seen a provision that deals with 
an overly broad patent; I have never seen a provision that deals 
with an incremental invention. 
To me, fundamentally, this is pejorative rhetoric without any 
analytical basis.  What it is really, is an attempt by an agency 
fundamentally charged with antitrust enforcement to use rhetoric 
rather than logic to try to take on the patent system.  And so I am 
really troubled by that. 
Then, when you get into the detail of it, you look in their 
report, starting at page five.  They talk about what they call 
questionable patents deterring or raising the cost of innovation and 
talk about incremental innovation.117  I don’t really see any serious 
support for those propositions. 
What they rely on are anecdotes from people in industry.  
When you look at the anecdotes, to me they don’t really stand up.  
There is an anecdotal statement of 90,000 patents generally related 
to microprocessors that are held by 10,000 people118  That’s 
attributed to Peter Detkin, who was the Patent Counsel of Intel119.  
Intel certainly didn’t operate that way.  Intel had a few core patents 
and they kept everybody else out of the field.120  They weren’t 
worried about 90,000 patents. 
When I represented a company called Digital, and we sued 
Intel on ten patents that related to their core microprocessor, they 
didn’t have any trouble figuring out what those were.  They settled 
very quickly. 
There really aren’t 90,000 patents that make a difference.  
There are only a handful, and people in business know who they 
are and what they are.  So I just think ultimately, that’s just empty 
rhetoric. 
 
 116 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (2000). 
 117 Id. at Executive Summary, 5–6. 
 118 Id. at Executive Summary, 6. 
 119 Id. at Executive Summary, 6 n.19. 
 120 See Press Release, FTC: Intel Abuses its Monopoly Power in Violation of Federal 
Law (June 8, 1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/06/intelc.htm. 
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The other talk about patent thickets and questionable patents 
really misses the fundamental point.  There are reasons to try to 
deal with patents that don’t stand up.  To me the fundamental 
problem with the patent system, which I do agree with the FTC on, 
is there needs to be some way to challenge patents on the 
conventional theories of invalidity without getting involved in a 
full-blown infringement suit. 
Under the current law, the only way you can challenge a patent 
is to bring a declaratory judgment suit, which means you have to 
be threatened by infringement.121  As a practical matter, that 
doesn’t really do any good in most industries because there are 
patents out there and you may never be threatened with a suit on 
them. 
I think most responsible organizationsthe FTC being among 
them, and also the National Science Foundation, and the various 
patent law groupshave realized that the time has come for some 
system in which there needs to be an administrative challenge of 
patents early on so that people can get rid of, or deal with, patents 
that are invalid.122 
But that doesn’t mean that the system is full of “questionable” 
patents or “overly broad” patents or the like.123  It means that our 
system has a hole in it, the hole being the ability to deal with those 
few patents that right now cannot be addressed because the only 
remedy is to wait until there is a full-blown infringement suit.  So I 
think that is one significant issue that needs to be dealt with. 
I think the other significant issue that needs to be dealt with, 
which is talked about, is the continuation practice in the patent 
world.124  The continuation practice is something that is really a 
 
 121 See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at ch. 3, p. 22 (discussing the difficulty in 
challenging a patent outside of an action for infringement and the limited availability of 
declaratory judgment actions). 
 122 See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 2 at Executive Summary, 7–8 (recommending the 
enactment of “legislation to create a new administrative procedure to allow post-grant 
review of and opposition to patents”). 
 123 But see id. at Executive Summary, 5–6 (describing a pervasive problem of 
questionable patents that harm innovation and competition). 
 124 A continuation is an application that essentially restarts the examination process.  It 
may be filed by applicant anytime prior to the patent being either issued or abandoned. 
See Mark A. Lemley & Kimberley L. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 
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creature of the last twenty years in the sense that, prior to the 
Federal Circuit, you could not continually write claims to cover 
new contributions as you saw them being made.125  You were 
really stuck more with what was in your original patent 
application.  The Federal Circuit has changed that rule.126 
There has always been the ability to file a continuation 
application;127 there is nothing new about that.  What is new is the 
ability to write claims in continuation applications, drafted 
specifically to cover contributions done after the patent application 
was filed and not really tell the Patent Office you’re doing it.  You 
don’t tell the PTO that you are writing these new claims to cover 
newly developed things.  What you do is you change the words 
around and suggest it was always part of your invention.128 
I find that to be a very troublesome practice and a practice that 
has spawned a lot of litigationmaybe not unnecessary litigation, 
but certainly expensive litigationand there needs to be a cure to 
that. 
One cure to that, which exists in other countries, is something 
called prior user rights, which is something that has been enacted 
 
B.U. L. REV. 63, 66–69 (2004)  It is often used where the applicant is dissatisfied with 
the Patent Office’s decision or the narrow scope of the patent’s claims. Id. 
 125 See Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Sayles, 97 U.S. 554, 555  
The law does not permit enlargements of an original specification any more 
than it does where letters-patent already granted are reissued. It regards with 
jealousy and disfavor any attempt to enlarge the scope of an application once 
filed, or of letters-patent once granted, the effect of which would be to enable 
the patentee to appropriate other inventions made prior to such alteration, or 
improvements which have gone into public. 
Id. 
 126 See Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc, 863 F.2d 867, 874 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988)   
It should be made clear at the outset of the present discussion that there is 
nothing improper, illegal or inequitable in filing a patent application for the 
purpose of obtaining a right to exclude a known competitor’s product from the 
market; nor is it in any manner improper to amend or insert claims intended to 
cover a competitor’s product the applicant’s attorney has learned about during 
the prosecution of a patent application. 
Id. 
 127 See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2000); 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(b) (2005). 
 128 See Lemley &. Moore, supra note 124 , at 76–79 (2004) (discussing problems arising 
from allowing claims to be rewritten in continuation applications to track competitors 
products). 
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in a very limited fashion in this country and probably ought to be 
more broadly enacted.129  Beyond that, I think there probably 
should be tighter restrictions on the continuation practice so that it 
doesn’t become as much of a game of patent applications, filing a 
series of five or ten continuation applications. 
Some of this problem has been cured with the change of the 
patent statute to allow a patent to be valid for twenty years from 
filing instead of seventeen years from issuance.130  So I think that a 
piece of this problem has been cured by the twenty-year term, and 
I think a further piece of it could be cured by changing the 
continuation practice. 
I think the other recommendation of the FTC, and also the 
National Science Foundation, that I agree with, is that there is a 
need to beef up the Patent and Trademark Office. More money 
must be spent on the Patent and Trademark Office to keep up with 
the increased number of applications and the increased 
technology.131 
What I don’t agree with is when you take the FTC’s premise of 
questionable patents, their cure is to tinker with the enforcement of 
patents by adding essentially ad hoc remedies to devalue patents 
and devalue the patent system.132  What I mean by ad hoc remedies 
are things like changing the burden of proof on invalidity from 
clear and convincing evidence to a mere preponderance of the 
evidence; changing the judicial standards on obviousness to 
something that would be much tougher to support the validity of 
the patent.133  I think those changes are unwarranted and uncalled 
for and have no analytical basis and I would be opposed to them. 
Thank you. 
 
 129 See Symposium, Fourth Biennial Patent System, Major Problems Conference, Prior 
Use Rights: Introductory Comments, 34 IDEA 117, 118-20 (1994) (statements by Slyvie 
A. Strobel comparing European approach to prior user rights to the U. S. approach). 
 130 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2002). 
 131 See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at Executive Summary, 12; NAS REPORT, supra note 
73, at 82. 
 132 See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at Executive Summary, 8–10. 
 133 See id. 
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MR. RICHARDS: I’ll start with you, Matthew.  Would you 
care to make any comments on anything that has been said since 
you spoke? 
MR. BYE: First thing, questionable patents.134  It’s not empty 
rhetoric.  It is a term that has been used by a number of the leading 
patent law organizations.  It is a term that is used by many 
businesses that come and testify to us.  So it’s an established term 
that has been used throughout the industry. 
In terms of support for our recommendations in this report, we 
have support at many different levels.  There is anecdotal support, 
but as is said, one person’s anecdotes are another person’s case 
study.  When you have all the leading businesses in many 
industries come and testify, and if they testify with a common 
theme, then there is something you can extract out of that.135 
We also rolled out a number of empirical studies that have 
looked at various aspects of the patent system and the ability of 
patents to spur innovation done over a number of years.  They are 
the two main bases. 
But I guess the thing I want to point out is we had companies 
like Microsoft and Intel and Cisco and Google and Symantec come 
to us, as well as pharmaceutical companies and biotech companies.  
Particularly, companies in the semiconductor industry and in 
software said, “There are problems with the patent system, it is 
harming our ability to innovate, it is harming our ability to bring 
new products to the market.”136 
The patent system essentially exists to promote innovation.137  
It is to help these companies do what they want to do.  If they are 
coming and telling us there is a problem, well maybe that is 
something that is genuinely worth listening to. 
I just want to make one final point about the FTC’s role.  The 
FTC is an antitrust enforcer.  We scrutinize all sorts of 
anticompetitive conduct.  We also have a role as a competition 
 
 134 See id. at 6 (discussing the filing of “questionable” patents; patents with no 
innovative value filed as a defensive mechanism). 
 135 See generally id. at ch. 3 (discussing specific issues raised by industry panelists). 
 136 See id. at Executive Summary, 5 n.16. 
 137 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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advocate.  We often do studies for various industries or look at an 
intersection of different issues.  A few years ago we looked at the 
Hatch-Waxman Act;138 we’ve looked at the patent system;139  
we’ve looked at the health care industry and released a report 
about that earlier this year.140 
Our job is essentially to look at roadblocks to competition–
whether they are regulatory or business conduct–and try to suggest 
reform to them.  Doing this report is really at the very heart of our 
mission. 
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you. 
Mary? 
MS. CRITHARIS: First, to address Matthew’s concern, when 
you are talking about questionable patents, are you talking about 
patents that you don’t feel should have been issued?  Is it because 
the law was too broad or because the PTO didn’t do a good job? 
I think it is important to at least distinguish between patents 
that maybe weren’t examined properly, that were erroneously 
issued, and patents that you just feel are too broad because there 
shouldn’t be a patent on a particular gene sequence or a patent on a 
particular software or way of doing business over the Internet.  
Denial of patents in this second category is based on statute.141  
The distinction is whether there is a concern that the USPTO is not 
doing a good job of examining the patent applications according to 
the law, or whether the law, as drafted by Congress, interpreted by 
the courts, and applied by the USPTO needs to be revisited. 
So I think I want to make at least that distinction first.  That’s 
for any of the panel members as well. 
QUESTION: In terms of questionable patents 
MR. RICHARDS: Can you please say who you are for the 
record? 
 
 138 See FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY (July 
2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf. 
 139 See generally  FTC, supra note 2. 
 140 See FTC, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION (July 2004), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarerpt.pdf. 
 141 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (defining the statutory limits of a patent). 
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QUESTION: [Inaudible] Maritzi, with Jones, Day. 
In terms of questionable patents, clients that we deal with and 
companies that are out there–in particular the pharmaceutical 
companies–tend to coin that phrase for patents that are used against 
them, but when they get them themselves, they are fine and 
wonderful. 
MS. CRITHARIS: That was the other thing. 
QUESTIONER: So I really have an issue with this category of 
questionable patents. 
I think we can probably do a better job of enforcement.  In 
Europe, for example, they have research use exceptions, where it is 
not an act of infringement if you are tinkering with the invention 
for a noncommercial purpose.142  In this country, we have created 
an exemption for actual commercial infringement with the Hatch-
Waxman Act,143 but the research to get there is not exempt.  So if 
you really want to spur innovation, probably the way to do it 
would be to make pure research free of infringement, but 
commercial activities actionable. 
I don’t know what the panel thinks about that. 
MR. RICHARDS: I would just make a comment on that 
because I did a paper at this year’s Fordham Conference on that 
particular topic.144 
The situation in Europe isn’t quite as you paint it because 
we’ve got some German Supreme Court decisions which say you 
cannot distinguish between commercial and noncommercial 
experimental use nowadays, which means that they are finding 
difficulty.145  The idea that people should be able to do research 
 
 142 See, e.g., Kilinische Versuche II, [1998] R.P.C. 423, 431-33 (German Supreme Court 
1998) “[A]ll experimental activities which relate to the object of the invention should be 
exempted.  This exemption should be granted regardless of any additional motivations 
that might be taken up and to which purposes the obtained results will ultimately be 
determined to serve.”  See id. 
 143 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2005). 
 144 See generally Fordham University School of Law Thirteenth Annual Conference 
onInternational Intellectual Property Law and Policy, at 
http://www.fordhamipconference.com/ (last visited May 16, 2005). 
 145 Tom Saunders, Renting Space on the Shoulders of Giants: Madey and the Future of 
the Experimental Use Doctrine, 113 YALE  L.J. 261, 264 (2003). 
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and they shouldn’t infringe a patent is appealing on its face.  What 
I argued in the paper that I gave in the spring was that we need 
some sort of fair use exception in patent law, similar to that which 
exists in copyright law.146  But I think it is a horribly difficult 
balancing test to try and work out exactly where that fair use 
boundary line should come out. 
That is obviously one element of where the patent system may 
be harming innovation, but it is not the essence of what we are 
talking about today, which is whether overly broad patents harm 
innovation. 
QUESTIONER: According to Article I, Section 8, inventors 
are supposed to be rewarded for their works.  The system we have 
now is, if you have a Nobel Prize-winning invention, it may not 
become commercially important until more than twenty years after 
the expiration of the patent.147  So we really have a system that 
does not serve the commercial needs or the goals of Article I, 
Section 8.148 
MR. RICHARDS: Other countries, in the past, have had 
provisions for extending patents where there has not been adequate 
remuneration during the normal life of the patent.149  They have all 
given them up because they found bigger problems with them than 
having a system such as we have. 
QUESTIONER: Isn’t it easier just to come up with some term-
of-years after granting the patent?  That kind of takes care of the 
problem. 
MR. RICHARDS: No, because that enables you to artificially 
delay the grant of your patent, which is what used to happen here. 
I don’t think you finished.  If you want to finish your remarks, 
then we’ll move on to the audience. 
 
 146 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 147 See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2005) (the term of a patent is 20 years). 
 148 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 149 See, e.g., Review of the Patents Act 1953: The Pharmaceutical Patent Term in New 
Zealand: Discussion Paper–Patent Term for Pharmaceuticals, at http://www.med. 
govt.nz/buslt/int_prop/pharmaceutical/discussion/discussion-03.html (noting that prior to 
1994, New Zealand’s patent law maintained a term of sixteen years with a possible 
extension of ten years if they can prove inadequate remuneration) (last visited May 15, 
2005). 
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MS. CRITHARIS: I have some other ones, but I thought that 
we would handle them as they come.  That’s why I asked the 
question about where the real concern lies.  Is it the patent law, as 
far as accommodating a broad spectrum of technologies, or is it the 
way the Patent Office is perhaps issuing patents that they don’t feel 
were properly examined.150  I think that is a key distinction. 
MR. RICHARDS: I agree with you.  I don’t think it’s an “or,” I 
think it’s an “and,” because I think both are really happening. 
I think the Patent Office does a very good job, but some stuff 
does get through, inevitably, and probably we need, as Herb has 
said and as the FTC says, some better way of dealing with that. 
But that is not the totality of the issue.  The other issue is 
whether the law itself permits patents which are overly broad, or 
patents which might harm innovation, because they prevent people 
from doing research which would otherwise lead to other 
innovation. 
The second half of that, I think, is outside our topic this 
morning and there are some other issues similar to that which 
might ultimately lead to the need to amend the patent law. 
The question of whether the law permits overly broad patents, 
even if properly examined, is something which the Federal Circuit 
of course has been wrestling with in its desperate attempts to work 
out what the “written description requirement” means over the last 
several years.151  Two years ago, when Herb and I were on a 
similar panel, I tried to get Herb to say something about the written 
description requirement and he declined.  I don’t know if he is 
going to decline this morning. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: About written description? 
MR. RICHARDS: Yes. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: I’ve been litigating both sides of it for 
companies.  I guess the only thing I would say about written 
 
 150 See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 2 at Executive Summary, 8–9 (discussing how the 
USPTO’s limited resources curb its ability to properly examine patents). 
 151 See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 
2004); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566–69 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (discussing what constitutes an adequate written description). 
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description is I believe that there is a statutory requirement for both 
written description and enablement, and I think both of then have 
to be there.152  I think that the written description and enablement 
should be interpreted in a way that they don’t go so far as to pick 
up after-occurring developments.  Namely, it seems to me that if 
you are going to sweep something into a patent that you did five 
years later, it ought to be both described and enabled by the 
original application.  That’s my basic view on written description 
and enablement. 
MR. RICHARDS: We are all sort of grappling with this sort of 
horror as to how broadly a patent should be allowed to be based on 
the original disclosure, or the original contribution to technology. 
There was a time when the UK had a provision in its statute 
that a patent could be invalidated on the ground it was not “fairly 
based.”153  That’s all it said in the statute.154  The courts basically 
interpreted that as saying that you should not be entitled to a scope 
of protection which went beyond what could soundly be predicted 
based on the core content of the disclosure.155  That, I think, is still 
the law in Australia and India and a few places.156  It is gone in the 
UK with the Europeanization of UK law.157 
I have sometimes wondered whether that might be useful, but 
that again had its problems in its application.  It is a difficult issue. 
Do you want to say more? 
MS. CRITHARIS: I do have a few other comments. 
I think it was pointed out that companies have come forward to 
the FTC saying that the patent system is preventing them from 
entering the market.  That is a fact.  The patent system does do 
 
 152 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2005). 
 153 Patents Act of 1949, 12, 13, & 14 Geo. 6, c. 87, § 5 (Eng.). 
 154 Id. 
 155 See generally Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 375 F.3d 1303 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004); Regents of University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997) 
 156 See, e.g., Patent Acts 1990, § 40(3) (Austl.) (“The claim or claims must be clear and 
succinct and fairly based on the matter described in the specification.”), available at 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ (last visited May 16, 2005). 
 157 See, e.g., generally Patents Act 2004 (Eng.) (updating several provision of UK patent 
law to conform with the European Patent Convention). 
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that.  That is the basis of our patent law.  So the fact that other 
people cannot enter the market with that particular invention is the 
basis for patent law. 
We have a lot of people who come to us and say, “Our patent 
protection is so important, it’s indispensable to the development of 
my company.”  The thing is, to us the benefit is the patent; even 
though somebody else cannot enter the market, that information is 
disclosed and available. 
I know the question was raised about whether there is a new 
invention out there and someone wants to do research on it and 
they are precluded from doing research on it if it has got any kind 
of commercial purpose.  There is the limited “experimental use” 
exception that’s not based in statute but is judicially based.158 
Without having the patent law and having the invention 
disclosed, the third party wouldn’t know it was there to even 
consider doing research on it.  So we have to keep that balance. 
We just haven’t seen a lot of evidence—you know, we have 
heard a lot of people talk about it and speculate—but we haven’t 
seen companies and researchers say that the patent law is 
preventing them from investing and doing research.  It depends on 
what side you’re on, and that is important, but overall we have not 
seen a lot of evidence where research has not progressed as a result 
of the current policies. 
I mean we have had huge development in the biotech industry 
and in the computer software industries despite patent 
protection.159  There has been growth of new industries, 
predominantly in the United States, and we have probably the 
strongest patent protection in the world in these areas.160  So I am 
 
 158 See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 
958 (2003); Integra v. Merck, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003), amended by Nos. 02-1052, 
02-1065, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27796 (June 6, 2003), petition for cert. filed, 72 
U.S.L.W. 3568 (U.S. Mar 2, 2004) (No. 03-1237). 
 159 See, e.g., John Waggoner, Biotech’s Booms Can Be Tempting, U.S.A. TODAY, May 
7, 2004, at 3B (discussing the rapid growth in the biotech industry between 2003 and 
2004). 
 160 See, e.g., Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from 
United States Patent Infringement Liability: Implications for University and Nonprofit 
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not really seeing the correlation between having patent protection 
and not having development and progress, and that is what the 
constitutional basis is; to have progress.161  I think there has been a 
lot of progress here. 
Now, I do recognize that sometimes we do issue patents that 
got through the system and that there are instances where I think 
everyone would benefit from a post-grant examination proceeding, 
opposition proceeding, and that is something that we do favor in 
the US-PTO and we have been looking at for several years now. 
But I do agree with David that the patent laws and the 
patentees are subject to the antitrust laws.162  That is 100 percent 
accurate.  If there is abuse in the marketplace, then the patentee 
should be 100 percent liable for that.  But just because there are a 
few bad actors, does that mean there is a need for changing the 
whole basis of the system? 
We talked a little bit about Hatch-Waxman.  I think part of the 
problem with talking about the pharmaceutical industry is that we 
do have this Hatch-Waxman law that is this very complex mixed 
hybrid between the patent law and the FDA rules.163  But even 
then, again, there were so many generic applications filed.  It was 
only a small percentage of bad actors again in those cases. 
I think that the report reveals what I would call some very 
serious antitrust-type anticompetitive behavior on the part of, not 
only the brand name, but also the generic companies who colluded 
to take this money for just staying off the market.164 
 
Research and Development, 56 BAYLOR L.REV. 917, 923 (2004) (discussing the United 
States’ lack of a broad statutory experimental use doctrine). 
 161 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 162 See Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (citing CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000)) 
(“Intellectual property rights do not confer a privilege to violate the antitrust laws.”); see 
generally Joel I. Klein, Cross-Licensing and Antitrust Law (May 2, 1997), at  
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1123.pdf (discussing the intersection of 
antitrust and patent law). 
 163 See generally Douglas A. Robinson, Recent Administrative Reforms of the Hatch-
Waxman Act: Lower Prices Now In Exchange for Less Pharmaceutical Innovation 
Later?, 81 WASH U.L.Q. 829, 836−840 (2003) (discussing the effect of the Hatch-
Waxman Act). 
 164 See A. Maureen Rouhi, Beyond Hatch-Waxman, CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS, 
Sept. 23, 2002, at http://pubs.acs.org/cen/coverstory/8038/8038biogenerics2.html 
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And there have been some recent changes to the Hatch-
Waxman law to prohibit automatic extensions—things like a 
thirty-month stay,165 and what has to be listed.166  Because the new 
Amendment allows for a second generic filer to obtain an 
exclusivity period, the first generic filer under the new regime, is 
not in the same bargaining position.167 
There are other things to be done rather than tinkering with the 
patent system in whole to address these really bad actors. 
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you. 
Now we will take from the floor here and then we’ll come back 
to our panelists after we have heard a bit more from the floor.  
Could you say who you are, please? 
QUESTION: Joseph Balacca. 
I think part of the problem with identifying certain patents as 
being overly broad, or just bad patents, is the uncertainty that 
results from an interpretation of the claims.  This is a consequence 
of the changes brought by the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit (“CAFC”) in the meaning of “doctrine of equivalents” and 
“file wrapper estoppel.”168  You come to a point in your practice in 
which you spend an awful lot of money and time examining 
 
(Marketing of generic products can be delayed through various maneuvers—in which 
generic companies and innovator drugmakers are either pitted against each other or work 
hand in hand) (emphasis added). 
 165 See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(IV) 
(2000); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2000)). 
 166 Id 
 167 Id; see also Laba Karki, Review of FDA Law Related to Pharmaceuticals: The 
Hatch-Waxman Act, Regulatory Amendments and Implications for Drug Patent 
Enforcement, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 602, 620 (2005).   
Under the ‘Forfeiture’ clause codified in 21 U.S.C. §355 (j) (5) (D) & (I), a 
“First Applicant” may forfeit its 180-day exclusivity if it fails to market its 
product within 75 days after it receives FDA approval or 30 months after 
ANDA submission whichever is earlier; or 75 days after a non-appealed 
favorable district court or favorable Federal Circuit court decision has been 
rendered; or 75 days after a favorable settlement has been entered; or 75 days 
after the patent expires or is withdrawn. 
Id. 
 168 See Symposium, The End of Equivalents? Examining the Fallout after Festo, 13 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 727 (2003) (discussing the effect of file 
wrapper and presecution history estoppel on the doctrine of equivalents). 
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competitors’ patents and trying to determine exactly what is 
covered by them.  Then you look at it, you order up the file 
wrappers, and you have no basis for telling your client exactly 
what is claimed because of the uncertainty brought about by claim 
interpretation.169  The claims should be limited to what they recite 
and you should be able to depend upon that. 
If the CAFC and the Supreme Court could produce a final, 
definitive statement as to what constitutes “doctrine of 
equivalents” and “file wrapper estoppel,” and make them narrow 
enough to be understandable and fairly applied across all different 
technologies, that would go a long way to removing these 
questionable patents.  Then, companies could then rely upon 
advice of counsel as to what is permitted and what is not permitted. 
Any comments? 
MR. SCHWARTZ: I think it is a great idea, but I don’t know if 
it is practical.  The doctrine of equivalents–people have tried to 
figure out how to deal with that for hundreds of years—and 
ultimately it’s an equitable doctrine, occasionally applied on a 
case-by-case basis when it is needed.170  It is really no more than 
that, and I don’t see how you would define it in any precise way. 
File wrapper estoppel is different.  I think you can have rules 
for that.  I think the Federal Circuit is trying to sort that out in 
Festo and its progeny,171 and maybe we’ll get some closure on that 
in the next ten years, when the last few cases are decided. 
So I think there will be some more certainty in file wrapper 
estoppel,172 but on doctrine of equivalents, I think its whole 
 
 169 See id. (noting that the Federal Circuit reverses district courts fifty percent of the 
time on claim interpretation). 
 170 See 60 AM. JUR. 2D Patents § 786 (noting that the doctrine is a highly factual inquiry 
that is applied at the time of infringement). 
 171 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 740 
(2002) (holding that prosecution history estoppel arises when an amendment is made to 
secure a patent and narrow the scope of the patent). 
 172 See Narda Microwave Corp. v. General Microwave Corp., 675 F.2d 542, 549 (2d 
Cir. 1982) (holding that a patent that preceded the sale of another item was not novel in 
design); Square Liner 360, Inc. v. Chisum, 691 F.2d 362, 370 (8th Cir. 1982); Ingersoll-
Rand Co. v. Brunner & Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 491, 497–98 (5th Cir. 1973); 60 AM. JUR. 2D 
Patents § 291. 
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purpose is not to have certainty.173  Therefore, I think you always 
need it for certain cases. 
MR. RICHARDS: As one who was brought up in the UK, 
which has a tradition of literal claim interpretation, that has its 
problems as well.174  There is an advantage to having a penumbra 
around the case to deal with the exceptional circumstance where 
you need it, and that clearly makes it difficult to give advice.  But 
that’s what we’re paid for. 
PARTICIPANT: Also we’re waiting for the en banc decision 
on claim construction.175  It would be nice if the panels at the 
Federal Circuit were consistent, but they are not.176  So it really is 
the luck of the draw on the day you walk in for your argument.  
I’m looking forward to seeing what they have to say in the latest en 
banc decision on claim construction. 
MR. RICHARDS: It’s astonishing that we have had claims 
since 1832, and in the present form since 1870 and the Federal 
Circuit sends out a request saying “please tell us what we’re 
supposed to do with these.”177  It’s absolutely astonishing in my 
view. 
PARTICIPANT: Don’t you think that some of the discrepancy 
in the written description recurrence stems from case law that 
interprets it before we had claims in the patent system which kind 
of elevated the requirements to a different level for interpreting? 
 
 173 See 60 AM. JUR. 2D Patents § 786 (noting that the inquiry is highly factual and 
applied at time of infringement). 
 174 See, e.g., Festo, 535 U.S. 722 at 731–33.  “If patents were always interpreted by their 
literal terms, their value would be greatly diminished.”  Id. at 731. 
 175 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 375 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1269) (order 
granting rehearing en banc); see generally Gregory A. Castanias, Intellectual Property 
Commentaries: A Report on the Federal Circuit’s En Banc Oral Argument on The Rules 
of Patent Claim Construction (Feb. 2005), at http://www.jonesday.com/pubs/ 
pubs_detail.aspx?pubid=39465603 (discussing the pending Philips v. AWH case) (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2005). 
 176 See Gregory J. Gallagher, Recent Development: The Federal Circuit and Claim 
Construction: Resolving the Conflict between the Claims and the Written Description, 4 
N.C. J. L. & TECH. 121, 121 (2002) (Comparing the Federal Circuit’s “canons of 
construction” between the written description of a claim and the claim itself.  One may 
not read limitation into a claim from a written description or  one may look to a written 
description to determine meaning in a claim.). 
 177 See Patent Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 198 (1870). 
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You know, we have the 1952 Act,178 and we do have claims, 
but a lot of the cases that I have seen the court relying on are from 
the era before the Act.179 
MR. RICHARDS: We have had claims in their present 
formulation since about 1870 and we have had claims in some 
form since 1832.  There is not much pre-1832 case law. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: I think the written description requirement 
stems from a fundamentally different path than the enablement 
requirement.180  The written description requirement stems from 
the notion that when someone reads your patent, they should have 
some understanding of what your invention is.181  The courts said 
that you “possess” your invention.182 
The requirement exists so that, when reading the patent, the 
reader can get some idea of the scope of it by reading it apart from 
what the words of the claim say.  That is really a different 
requirement than enablement, which is a requirement that says you 
have to teach how to do it.183  So I think they are separate and 
distinct, and there are reasons for each. 
 
 178 The Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.(2000)). 
 179 See, e.g., Festo, 535 U.S. 722 at 732 (citing Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 
(1854)). 
 180 See, e.g., Noelle v. Lederman, 355 F.3d 1343, 1348  (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that an 
applicant must convey with clear and convincing clarity in a written description that he 
was the first to possess it, whereas an enablement only explains how to make and use the 
invention). 
 181 See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 922 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (noting that the written requirement teaches the public how to use an invention in 
exchange for a limited monopoly on that patent). 
 182 See Noelle, 355 F.3d at 1348 (“The purpose of the ‘written description’ requirement 
is broader than to merely explain how to ‘make and use’; the applicant must also convey 
with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or 
she was in possession of the invention.”) (emphasis in the original); Application of 
LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 1134 (C.C.P.A. 1962).  
We think it is sound law, consistent with the public policy underlying our 
patent law, that before any publication can amount to a statutory bar to the 
grant of a patent, its disclosure must be such that a skilled artisan could take its 
teachings in combination with his own knowledge of the particular art and be in 
possession of the invention. 
Id. 
 183 See Noelle, 355 F.3d at 1348 (noting that enablement merely requires an applicant to 
convey how to “make and use” an invention). 
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I don’t think it is just caused by the 1952 Act.  There plainly 
are at least three judges in the Federal Circuit who would like to 
get rid of the written description requirement.184  I’m not so sure 
why, but they plainly want to do that.  I mean it’s no mystery.  It’s 
just Judge Rader and a couple others.185  Whether that will happen 
or not is hard to know. 
But, at least at the moment, I think the requirement exists and it 
will continue.  If you listen to the ones who want to get rid of it, 
they want to leave it in priority contests and get rid of it 
everywhere else. 
MR. RICHARDS: Can you give your name, please? 
QUESTION: Michelle Baker.  I’m an individual. 
It seems to me that the question of patent thickets is a very 
different issue, a very different problem, from overly broad 
patents.186  The remedy should be very different.  Generally, patent 
thickets are overly narrow patents or many narrow patents.187  
Maybe there doesn’t even need to be a remedy in that case because 
you can invent around this problem, assuming that you get around 
the cost of figuring out what the patent actually is claiming.  So by 
lumping patent thickets with overly broad patents, I think you will 
find the wrong remedies. 
 
 184 See Moba v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 464 (2003). 
 185 See id. at 1322–27 (Rader, J. concurring) (arguing that “by making written 
description a free-standing disclosure doctrine, [the Federal Circuit] produces numerous 
unintended and deleterious consequences”). 
 186 Michael R. Taylor & Jerry Cayford, American Patent Policy, Biotechnology, and 
African Agriculture: The Case for Policy Change, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 349–50 
(2004). 
This pattern—the increasing number of patents, increasing patent breadth, and 
the issuance of patents on more basic discoveries—has created what some call 
a patent thicket in biotechnology: ‘an overlapping set of patent rights requiring 
that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from 
multiple patentees.’ The patent thicket is a problem because useful innovation 
in biotechnology requires multiple inventive steps and technologies. The field 
of biotechnology is particularly dependent on the cumulative work of many 
researchers, and therefore is vulnerable to the ‘anticommons’ problem 
mentioned earlier. 
Id. 
 187 See Janet L. McDavis & Minda Schechter, The FTC’s Recent Report, NAT’L L.J., 
Dec. 8, 2003, at 13. 
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MR. RICHARDS: I think the patent thicket issue tends to come 
up in those industries where you’ve got multiple patents on a 
particular product.  Then, everybody needs to get their patents to 
trade, to get a license from somebody else to be able to put the 
product on the market, which tends to be the electrical end of the 
spectrum rather than the chemical end of the spectrum. 
QUESTIONER: That’s right.  But if you think about the fact 
that each patent is presumably an innovation of some sort, when 
you have a patent thicket, generally those thickets are minor 
innovations, or you could at least make that argument.  There are 
costs. 
MR. BYE: The CEO of one of the businesses that came in to us 
testified that he gave a whole series of patents on a particular area 
of software technology to his engineers and said, “Can you get a 
sense of what the patent landscape is?”  The engineers went away 
and they came back a week later and they said, “We really have no 
idea.  We think all these patents probably infringe on each other 
and they probably infringe our product, and we really can’t be sure 
either way.” 
Thickets definitely are a different problem to overly broad 
patents.188  There is no clear solution to it.  It is a matter of making 
sure that you issue patents that do comply with the statutory 
requirements and doing things like that.  There is no master stroke, 
unfortunately, that you can do to solve a problem like that. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: I don’t know why you would rely on 
engineers to decide on the scope of patents .  That’s why you have 
lawyers.  So that doesn’t make any sense to me at all. 
QUESTIONER: Well, also, patent thickets are only relevant to 
big firms.  What they do is sort of defensive patenting and they’re 
just trading off the rights.  They do not necessarily promote 
innovation.189 
 
 188 See generally id. (describing patent thickets as arising from numerous narrow patents 
and not overly broad patents). 
 189 See Symposium, Biotechnology Patents Get Special Treatment, Biotechnology in the 
Federal Circuit: A Clockwork Lemon, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 441, 451–52 (2004) (“Patent 
thickets block follow-on innovation; an innovator must metaphorically cut her way 
through the underbrush in order to complete a project that she wants to accomplish.”) 
(statement of Dan L. Burk); see also Mueller, supra note 163 at 944–45 n.130. 
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MR. SCHWARTZ: I think the phrase, “patent thicket,” gets 
used in two different contexts.  I agree that in one context it’s used 
by one person who has a lot of different patents covering different 
features, and that has certainly been done in the past.  I think it is 
also used in your context, by a lot of different people that have 
patents that are arguably overlapping or arguably one is an 
improvement on the other, and that in itself becomes a “thicket.”190 
In a number of industries, the practical resolution of this 
problem has been standard-setting and licenses under standards.191  
At least in a lot of industries that has really worked out pretty well.  
You don’t need the FTC to hit you over the head to decide to do 
that.  In an awful lot of the electronic and telecommunications 
industries that’s what they have.192  There are standard-setting 
organizations and arrangements to license patents in standard-
setting organizations.  In most situations that works reasonably 
well.193 
To me, again, it’s a pejorative term that doesn’t follow as much 
in the real world. 
QUESTION: My name is Raymond Dowd.  My area of 
practice is copyright and trademark litigation.  I am not a patent 
attorney. 
 
 190 Compare Bessen, supra note 58, at 1 (stating thickets “occur when each 
product [involves] many patents . . .”) with McDavis & Schechter, supra note 187, at 13 
(discussing narrow patents as the basis for patent thickets). 
 191 See Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, 
Antitrust Division, to Gerrard R. Beeney, Esq. (Dec. 16, 1998) at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2121.htm. (last visited May 16, 2005) (noting 
how cross-licensing has allowed innovation in the DVD industry). 
 192 See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and 
Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, Abstract (Adam B. 
Jaffe et al. eds., 2001) available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/thicket.pdf 
(last visited May 9, 2005). 
The need to navigate the patent thicket and hold-up is especially pronounced in 
industries such as telecommunications and computing in which formal 
standard-setting is a core part of bringing new technologies to market.  Cross-
licenses and patent pools are two natural and effective methods used by market 
participants to cut through the patent thicket, but each involves some 
transaction costs. 
Id. 
 193 See id. 
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I was wondering if there has been discussion over developing 
some sort of compulsory licensing system, particularly where the 
U.S. government funds the innovation that leads to the creation of 
a patent.  Would a system of compulsory licensing make sense to 
any of the members of the panel as a resolution to some of these 
issues? 
MR. SCHWARTZ: First of all, for government funding, I think 
there usually is compulsory licensing.194  But as far as the United 
States goes, one of the reasons that people, especially in the 
pharmaceutical industry, are very much opposed to compulsory 
licensing is they believe that would be the death knell of 
innovation.195 
The heart of the matter is that it is not coincidental that the 
major pharmaceutical research in the world is done in the United 
States, which is one of the few countries that has a strong patent 
system with no compulsory license.  That justifies the investment, 
at least in pharmaceuticals, to be worth bringing it to market.196 
There may be circumstances where compulsory licensing 
makes sense–and some countries are in favor of it–but I think the 
basic notion has been debated for 200 years at least and has been 
continually rejected up until now. 
MR. RICHARDS: Sir? 
QUESTION: My name is Jean-Paul Ciardullo.  I’m a staff 
member of the Journal. 
When you were talking about overlapping and overly broad 
patents being issued to the same companies or individuals, what do 
 
 194 See The Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 
35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2004)). 
 195 See Adi Gillat, Compulsory Licensing to Regulated Licensing: Effects on the Conflict 
Between Innovation and Access in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
711, 716 (2003) (noting that the grant of a license without the patent holder’s 
authorization limits the exclusivity period and allows he recipient to engage in 
competitive imitation, which would lessen the original incentive to innovate). 
 196 See Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceutical Patents: An 
Unreasonable Solution to an Unfortunate Problem, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 295, 304 (1994) 
(attributing the financial growth of the pharmaceutical industry to exclusivity provided by 
patent law). 
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you think the role of terminal disclaimers could play in abating that 
problem?197 
MR. SCHWARTZ: I think terminal disclaimers are useful and 
you have them when they are appropriate, but I don’t think they 
really deal with what the FTC is talking about. 
MS. CRITHARIS: Terminal disclaimers are filed only by the 
same applicant, so you cannot have them for different 
companies.198  It is only when there is double-patenting involved 
and it is the same inventive entity.199  So the fact that you have 
different companies out there, you really do not have terminal 
disclaimer practice. 
QUESTIONER: Even for, let’s say, the same company, if you 
have one pharmaceutical company that is coming in and trying to 
get perhaps unfair extensions on what is effectively the same 
product? 
MR. SCHWARTZ: I think nowadays you are really stuck with 
a twenty-year term.200  I think the twenty-year term has really 
eliminated all of that.  You are stuck with a twenty-year term from 
date of application and that does offer you protection within that 
time.201 
I think you have to terminally disclaim.  You’ve got to 
terminally disclaim the continuations because you’re stuck with it 
anyway. 
QUESTIONER: Just one more comment.  When we talk about 
extensions of patents, especially in the pharmaceutical area, that is 
really no longer innovation; that is just trying to keep the product 
on the market that has already been innovated maybe twenty years 
earlier.  So I don’t see that activity as putting a chilling effect on 
true innovation where you have to look at projections into the 
future.  The technology developed today may not become a 
 
 197 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a) (2005) (a terminal disclaimer is used when an applicant has 
two or more applications pending wherein the subject matter is so closely related it 
appears that it is an attempt to get numerous patents on the single invention). 
 198 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a) (2005). 
 199 See USPTO MANUAL, supra note 37, § 804.02 
 200 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2002). 
 201 See id. 
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commercial reality for another twenty years.  So I just see that as 
kind of holding on to what you already have, rather than what you 
will have.  I don’t think it has a chilling effect on true innovation. 
What does the panel think? 
MR. RICHARDS: I think the problem in the pharmaceutical 
industry tends to be where you come up with a new formulation 
towards the end of the life of the basic patent.  You decide that a 
particular polymorph, a particular form of the crystallized product, 
is the thing which is really the great thing rather than the sort of 
generic disclosure that you had twenty years ago. 
There are arguments, pro and con, on that.  There is no reason 
why—if it really is an invention—just because it is relatively 
minor as compared to the main one, that you shouldn’t be entitled 
to a patent for it.  The other question is, is it really an invention, 
and that’s where the examination issue comes up again. 
MR. BYE: The critical thing is the presence or absence of 
generic competition.  Where you have this sort of patent life 
extension, you may be preventing generic companies from entering 
those markets, thereby denying consumers low-cost drug 
products.202  Innovation is critical.  Competition is also critical.  
You have to have both components and you have to have them 
working in some balance. 
QUESTION: That was my only point.  That is the competition.  
But I don’t think it has any chilling effect on innovation or on new 
technologies that would spur our economy as a country in the 
future.  That is my feeling. 
MS. CRITHARIS: I would like to add that before the 
enactment of Hatch-Waxman,203 which was in 1984, the generic 
market was a very small component of the marketplaceI think it 
was less than 19 percent.204  Since Hatch-Waxman, it is now, 
 
 202 See Chris Adams & Gardiner Harris, Drug Makers Face Battle to Preserve Patent 
Extensions, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2002, at A24. 
 203 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §355 (2000); 35 U.S.C. §§ 
156, 271, 282 (2000)). 
 204 See Merrill Matthews, Patent Protection for Me, But Not For You, June 14, 1002, at 
http://www.cnehealth.org/pubs/IPI-PatentProtection.pdf (noting that “the generic industry 
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according to the FTC report, upwards of 45 or 50 percent.205  So 
the Hatch-Waxman Act did really spur generic competition, which 
is a great thing.206  I mean we are trying to find just the right 
balance, which is a difficult thing, especially in the pharmaceutical 
area.  We are talking about access to medicines. 
But I think it is important to point out that patents get a twenty-
year term from filing.207  The problem in the pharmaceutical area is 
that even though you may get a patent, you might not get 
marketing approval from the FDA to enter the market until much 
later.  That is why it is important to have some kind of patent 
termwe don’t call it “extension”restoration, because that 
patentee had no market exclusivity at all because he can’t enter the 
market until he gets FDA approval. 
Studies have indicated that the average life of a pharmaceutical 
patent is really only about ten or eleven years because they have 
lost all that time in regulatory approval.208  So there is just a 
mechanism to compensate the patent owner, to at least get some 
more exclusivitynot more than other patentees, but just to give 
him some, because in some cases they are left with five or seven 
years, and that is really just not enough. 
MR. BALTO: Wait.  I can’t let you get away with that.  They 
have a monopoly for the five-to-seven years, or three years, or 
whatever it is, and they will price at the monopoly price, and they 
will recover what they recover, whether you give them an 
 
has also prospered under Hatch-Waxman. Its share of the prescription drug market has 
grown from 19 percent of the volume in 1984 to 47 percent in 2000, according to IMS 
Health). 
 205 See Ashoke Bhattacharjya, FTC Health Care Workshop Panel on Branded and 
Generic Pharmaceuticals  (Sept. 10, 2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/healthcare/ 
bhatta.pdf (Sept. 10, 2002). 
 206 See id. 
 207 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2002). 
 208 See The Biojudiciary Project, Patent Life, Generic Drugs, and the Drug Approval 
Process, at http://www.biojudiciary.org/subpage1.asp?tid=110 (last visited May 9, 
2005).(“the long FDA approval process strips a large fraction of the twenty-year patent 
term and decreases the patent life of a drug.”). 
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eighteen-year patent or a three-year patent.  That’s what economics 
shows.209 
But I want to go back to a point you made earlier about 
questionable patents.  I don’t wantwell, actually, personally I do 
wantall of you to leave the room and think that there is no 
problem of questionable patents, because that means that Matthew 
and I will have enough work to do when you misinform your 
clients in the future about what they can and cannot do.  That will 
result in substantial legal fees to my law firm. 
It is very valuable to read the testimony of the FTC hearings.210  
You hear this over and over again in the testimony from business 
people in many different industries.211  The problem is that they are 
spending money to go and create patents and to do regulatory 
filings, so that they are in a bargaining position to enter into cross-
licensing arrangements. 
I have no qualms about protecting intellectual property rights 
when what is being protected is real invention, when what is 
happening is protecting the incentives to innovate.  But when what 
you are doing is creating regulatory gauntlets, wars of mutual 
destruction, where people just try to overwhelm each other with 
patent filings and creating mutually adverse thickets, I don’t think 
you are creating any kinds of incentives as to innovation. 
One more point.  The important empirical studies that are cited 
in the FTC report212you know, are patents questionable?  What 
happens when patents are effectively litigated?  They are 
oftentimes struck down.  They are struck down a remarkably great 
amount of times.213 
 
 209 See, e.g., generally Grid Systems Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc., 771 F. Supp. 
1033, 1038 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (noting that a patent holder may charge the maximum price 
that the market can bear). 
 210 Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based 
Economy, at  http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/index.htm (last visited May 9, 2005) 
(listing the relevant hearings and providing links to speeches). 
 211 See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at Executive Summary, 5–7 (summarizing the 
various testimony by industrial representatives on defensive patent practices and patent 
thickets). 
 212 See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at ch.2, p. 11. 
 213 See, e.g., Univ. of Houston Law Center, U.S. Patent Litigation Statistics, at 
http://www.patstats.org/ (last visited May 9, 2005).  (illustrating the number of times a 
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Now, you may say that is not a problem because there are 
plenty of avenues for people to challenge patents or bring antitrust 
suits to challenge anticompetitive activity.214  The problem 
identified by the FTC report is that not everybody can sue, not 
everybody has the resources to go and sue and try to challenge an 
invalid patent, especially the way the patent litigation system is 
currently set up.215 
So the FTC report says, “Here are a few adjustments to the 
patent litigation system that will make it work more effectively.”216  
It doesn’t say, “Let’s go and cut back on these rights substantially” 
or anything like that.  It is just saying, “Let’s overcome these 
barriers so people can truly vindicate their intellectual property 
rights or appropriately challenge them.”217 
MR. SCHWARTZ: I couldn’t disagree more.  It just seems to 
me that’s simply not so.  There are two pieces to the FTC report.218  
The piece about having an alternative mechanism for challenging 
patents is not new at the FTC.219  They have just hopped on the 
bandwagon of lots of other people.  There needs to be a way to 
challenge patents in the PTO.  Everyone agrees with that. 
The second piece of it, which David calls tinkering and the 
FTC calls tinkering, is a fundamental change in the law to make it 
easier to invalidate patents.220  That is really what is going on in 
the FTC report. 
 
patent owner prevailed compared to the number of times an alleged infringer infringer 
prevailed between the years of 2000 to 2004) 
 214 See, e.g., United States Patent and Trademark Office, Report to Congress On Inter 
Partes Examination, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/reports/ 
reexamreport.pdf (discussing the inter partes challenges to patents). 
 215 See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at Executive Summary, 6 (stating that existing 
avenues to challenging patent validity or assess potential infringement present prohibitive 
costs). 
 216 See generally id. at Executive Summary, 7–17 (discussing the FTC’s proposed 
reforms). 
 217 See, e.g., id. at ch. 5, 31–32. 
 218 See generally FTC REPORT, supra note 2. (discussing FTC recommendations to 
allow post-grant review and to change the standard of review for evidence necessary to 
invalidate a patent) 
 219 See FTC REPORT, supra note 2 at 7−9 (discussing new legislative recommendations). 
 220 See id. at Executive Summary, 8–11. 
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That is what is going on by changing the burden of proof from 
clear and convincing evidence, to a mere preponderance of the 
evidence standard.221  As someone who has litigated patents, I 
know of no single change effected by the Federal Circuit that had 
more long-term effect in sustaining patents’ validity.  I think that 
this goes to the heart of the FTC’s attempt and desire to, in effect, 
get rid of that and erode that and turn it back to the days when 
patents are, as a practical matter, presumed invalid.222 
That’s what this is all about, and I decry it as a terrible idea, not 
a little tinkering. 
MR. BALTO: Herb, let’s just stick with that last idea about the 
burdens of proof.  I, as just a general litigator look at that and say, 
“I think the FTC’s argument is sound about why it shouldn’t be 
clear and convincing.”  You know, when you look at general 
litigation, this looks like the appropriate thing for a challenge 
under the preponderance of the evidence standard.  Maybe 
Matthew knows more examples than I do.  But clear and 
convincing just basically sets such a high bar that very few people 
are going to be able to effectively challenge the patents.223 
MR. SCHWARTZ: That’s contrary to what you said a few 
minutes ago, where 50 percent of patents are held invalid.  That 
can’t possibly be.  The standard has allowed significant numbers of 
patents to be held invalid. 
The previous standard of preponderance of the evidence was 
such that, ultimately it got to the point where the Supreme Court 
said, “No patent has been held to be valid that has ever come 
 
 221 Brenda Sandburg, FTC Floats Controversial Plan (Oct. 29, 2003), at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1067350952811; Anna Vishey, Patent Industry 
Responds to FTC Recommendations (Fall 2004), at http://www.srz.com/PDF-files/ip-
fa04—vishev.pdf. (discussing the FTC’s proposed reduction of the standard of “clear and 
convincing evidence” to a “Preponderance of evidence” for the invalidation of patents) to 
reduce litigation risk) 
 222 David C. Bohrer, Knocking the Eagle Off the Patent Owner’s Shoulder: Chiron 
Holds that 
Jurors Don’t Have to Be Told That a Patent is Presumed Valid, 21 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 259, 271–72 (2004). 
 223 See Symposium, Ideas Into Action: Implementing Reform of The Patent System: 
Reforming Patent Validity Litigation: The “Dubious Preponderance,” 19 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 923 (2004) 
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before us.”224  The Federal Circuit was trying to put some balance 
into the enforcement of patents and to get rid of the notion that, at 
least in the Eighth Circuit, no patent was sustained for thirty years.  
That is what you got with the preponderance of the evidence 
standard. 
I think clear and convincing was an attempt to remedy it.  As 
far as I know, considering the numbers of patents that are held 
invalid, which I think is still very high225, it suggests that it is still 
working. 
That doesn’t go to the other point, which I agree with: that you 
need an additional way to deal with patents in the PTO.  Simply 
going to litigation is not a sensible solution for an awful lot of 
controversies.  To me, that is the most important thing.  The FTC is 
certainly on the right bandwagon on that, but it is very different 
than to me changing the standard of proof. 
MR. BYE: The number of patents that are invalidated, the 
statistic is not the critical thing.  If you say, “Well, 50 percent are 
invalidated; therefore, that’s a good amount,” that is essentially a 
meaningless number. 
The critical question is: is the standard that we are applying 
appropriate for the examination that the patents get?  The current 
standard is deemed too high for three main reasons. 
One is that patent law and patent regulations favor the 
applicant.  There are a number of presumptions that basically force 
examiners to issue things unless they can essentially produce a 
counter-argument.226  These examiners are operating under very 
tight time constraints, as I mentioned before, eight to twenty-five 
hours.  So the burden is essentially put on them to rebut the 
application. 
 
 224 Jungersen v. Ostby, 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (“[I] doubt that the remedy for such 
Patent Office passion for granting patents is an equally strong passion in this Court for 
striking them down so that the only patent that is valid is one which this Court has not 
been able to get its hands on.”) (Jackson, J. dissenting). 
 225 See Univ. of Houston Law Center, supra note 213. 
 226 See Chester v. Miller, 906 F.2d 1574, 1578 (1990) (describing how 35 U.S.C. 132 
can be violated by an examiner for failing to provide adequate reasons for rejecting a 
patent application). 
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Second, the whole examination process is ex parte,227 there is 
no one else involved, so the patent sort of slides through.  And it is 
examined on a preponderance standard.228 
Third, when the patent is issued and you take it to court, 
suddenly the standard to protect it is clear and convincing.229  
There is an imbalance there.  The treatment that it gets in the 
examination stage doesn’t warrant that higher standard when it 
gets into court. 
I will confess there have been quite strong reactions to this 
recommendation.  Some patent litigators say it is the worst thing 
that could ever be done to the patent system.  But there are also 
many other patent litigators who said, “Yes, actually we think 
that’s a really sensible idea.  We think that would be an 
improvement to the system.”  It is not clear what the correct view 
is, but I think this is an important issue and needs to be considered. 
QUESTION: But, patents are not just granted without any 
foundation.  I have been involved in litigation in getting patents.  If 
you think it is that easy, it isn’t.  When you have an examiner who 
is really giving you a hard time on certain issues, those issues are 
thoroughly documented on the record. 
I think what Herb is saying is that the standard that we 
currently face in litigation takes into account the fact that you have 
had this examination on the merits.  If you find evidence that 
wasn’t part of that record, then you can more easily meet the clear 
and convincing standard. 
Do you disagree, Herb? 
MR. SCHWARTZ: No, I don’t disagree with that at all.  To 
me, in practice the clear and convincing standard has been working 
well. 
QUESTIONER: It makes sense. 
 
 227 35 U.S.C. §§ 302, 307 (2002). 
 228 See USPTO MANUAL,, supra note 37, § 2142. 
 229 See David W. Okey, Issued Patents and the Standard of Proof: Evidence Clear and 
Convincing or Merely Ponderous, 17 JOHN MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 557 
(Winter 1999), available at http://www.jcil.org/journal/articles/206.html. 
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MR. SCHWARZ: There has been no hue and cry against it.  In 
fact, the only organization that has really come out and tried to 
change it is the FTC, who fundamentally wants to get rid of patents 
anyway. 
QUESTIONER: I mean we’re not South Africa, which just 
issues patents without examination. 
MR. BYE: Can I just say that’s absolutely not true that we 
want to get rid of patents. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: You certainly do. 
MR. BYE: Throughout the entire report it discusses how 
important patents are to driving innovation.  They are a critical 
aspect in many industries.  We might not even have some 
industries without them. 
Back in the 1960s and the 1970s, the patent and antitrust 
doctrines tended to butt a lot of heads, and many of the problems 
were due to antitrust enforcement,230 which wasn’t really anchored 
in any conceptual framework.  Since the early 1980s and moving 
forward, antitrust has incorporated economics into its analysis and 
its treatment of patents is quite different to what it used to be.231  
The FTC firmly acknowledges the importance of patents.  So I 
think it is important to correct that misperception. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: I would suggest you to read the report of 
the National Science Foundation, called “A Patent System for the 
21st Century.”232  That was a group that does not have a 
particularly either pro-patent bias or anti-patent bias.  They happen 
to be a group of people on all sides of this subject.  They have 
written a very, I think, interesting and provocative report. 
They agree on the basic notions of strengthening the patent 
system by having a post-application review system and 
strengthening the Patent Office.233  They do not, at all, get into 
what I would consider to be the more controversial patent-bashing 
 
 230 See Gary Stix, IP Rights – And Wrongs, SCI. AM., May 2002, at 38, available at 
http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~engrtutr/IPRights.pdf.  (discussing the effect of aggressive 
antitrust enforcement on patent applications) 
 231 See id. (noting the increase in the number of patents granted from 1980 to 2001) 
 232 NAS REPORT, supra note 73. 
 233 See id. 
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aspects of the FTC report, and that is really the startling difference 
between the two. 
When you look at the people who put this together and you 
look at the FTC report, you are left with the conclusion that, no 
matter what the gentleman says here, the FTC is fundamentally 
looking for a mechanism to weaken patents.234 
The National Science Foundation report is an attempt to look at 
both sides of this problem and see what can be done to strengthen 
innovation overall and look at the good, the bad, and the ugly and 
try to clean up the system.235  In other words, I think that it is a 
balanced and fair report and I don’t believe that is true with the 
FTC report.  I think if anyone would read the two, you would 
begin to understand why I say that. 
MR. RICHARDS: Mary wants to say something. 
MS. CRITHARIS: I have a question.  I’ve pretty much only 
worked for the Patent Office.  I worked in private practice before 
for a little while, and I did work at the Solicitor’s Office in the 
Patent Office, which defends the cases. 
My understanding has always been, from most litigators, that 
when you go to litigation, there is not an issue of whether there 
was a good examination or not.  The issue is litigation usually 
involves the introduction of prior art that was not considered by the 
examiner doing the prosecution of the application. 
But I think to make the implication that Matthew was making, 
that things slide by, I think that is a little incorrect.236  I was an 
examiner for five years.  I issued about nine or ten patents a year.  
That’s a very low percentage rate.  Most of the people in our unit 
had a very low percentage rate.  Because it was chemical arts, a lot 
of stuff was pretty much already known.  It is different in some of 
the other areas. 
 
 234 See generally FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at ch. 1, pp. 18–23 (stating the patent 
protection was strengthened by the courts during the 1980s and implying a better balance 
must be reached to achieve proper competition). 
 235 See NAS REPORT, supra note 73. (suggesting reforms to the current system of 
patents) 
 236 See supra text accompanying note 227. 
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But I don’t know if it is fair to necessarily say that a poor-
quality patent gets litigated.  Some things go to litigation and I 
don’t know if it has to do with whether the quality of the patent is 
poor. 
So I guess I’d like to ask Herb, and the others what their 
experience is with that. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: As I said, I have never heard of the 
concept, other than in the FTC report, of what they call “poor-
quality patents.”237  Usually when you litigate patents and you are 
litigating the issue of validity, it is about art that wasn’t before the 
Patent Office.  It is very rare in this day and age to re-litigate over 
art that was before the Office.  When all is said and done, the art 
usually has been considered by the Office and it is very hard to 
persuade a hearing officer that it should come out differently. 
I don’t think that it matters whether the standard is clear and 
convincing or a preponderance of the evidence.  The usual issues 
are new art or publicationsa lot of times it’s publications that the 
Office didn’t seeand certainly if the art is a prior public use it 
raises issues of invalidity that most likely could not have been 
before the PTO office. 
So I think a lot of the issues are ones that could never have 
arisen in the Patent Office.  I’ve been involved on both sides of this 
argument: whether or not the arguments made in the Patent Office 
should have persuaded the Office differently.  Ultimately, it is a 
very hard argument to make out either way. 
MR. BALTO: Matthew, you would be doing a disservice to 
yourself to accept on face value what Herb tells you about the FTC 
report.  It would be sort of like watching the American League 
Championship Series and turning off the TV after the third game. 
If you look at the specific chapter that deals with the point that 
we are rigorously debating,238 you will see a very moderate, even-
handed tone going to the burden of proof issue, and not using 
pejorative terms, as is suggested.  Rather, this chapter looks very 
 
 237 See FTC REPORT, supra note 2 at Executive Summary, 5. 
 238 Id. at ch. 5. 
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carefully at what is being patented and the obstacles such patents 
create for innovation.239 
That is the issue that we are faced with on this program today: 
is the intellectual property regulation working in such a fashion 
that it actually stifles innovation? 
MR. RICHARDS: Matthew? 
MR. BYE: I would commend the National Academy’s report to 
people.  I think it is a fabulous report.  All the evidence that they 
used in that report is exactly the same evidence that we rely on in 
our report.240 
I also want to point out one of the major recommendations they 
do make; they say there are problems with the obviousness 
standard, that too many obvious patents are being issued, the 
standards are not right, and they should be tightened up to prevent 
this happening.241  That almost exactly overlaps with one of the 
recommendations we make.242 
The other thing I want to get back to, which is the statement I 
began my presentation with, is that you have to be mindful of the 
two spheres we are dealing with here—the sphere of innovation 
that competition can promote and the sphere of innovation that the 
patent system can promote.  If you increase one, you affect the 
other. 
The critical thing is to put them in a proper balance and be 
mindful that if you adjust things in the patent system you might be 
displacing competition, and competition is the baseline, as the 
Supreme Court says, of the U.S. economy.243  This balance is a 
very important fact to be mindful of. 
MR. RICHARDS: Anything more from the audience? 
 
 239 Id. 
 240 Compare NAS REPORT, supra note 73 with FTC REPORT, supra note 2. 
 241 See FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at Executive Summary, 10–12 (discussing 
obviousness in “Recommendation #3”). 
 242 See FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at Executive Summary, 9–11. 
 243 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (holding 
that “Federal patent laws embody ‘a careful balance between the need to promote innovation and 
the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention 
itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.’”); FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at ch. 1, p. 
3. 
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David, maybe you would like to sum up. 
QUESTION: One question.  My name is Judy Bass.  I am a 
media lawyer in private practice, but I don’t do patents. 
I actually found it somewhat interesting that there is this sort of 
tension going on within the government.  I have never seen the 
government work so well to both safeguard competition and also to 
try to curb it in the right way. 
I am wondering what happens with this report now, these 
recommendations.  You mentioned these town hall meetings are 
going to happen.  Ultimately is this a legislative matter?  What 
would have to happen to get some of these innovations, either in an 
administrative proceeding or whatever, to take effect?  What is the 
next step? 
MR. BYE: There are a number of steps that could be taken.  
Many of the recommendations we make discuss legislative reform, 
like creating this post-grant review procedure or giving the PTO 
more funding.244  There are other recommendations we make that 
could be addressed through court decisions, and that is one of the 
things we note, that we are going to have an increasing role in 
filing amicus briefs.  Then, the perspective we bring to bear on 
these issues can be delivered to courts at that sort of range.245  
Those are two areas that things can happen. 
Another great thing this report has done, it has spurred so much 
debate across the country.  We even had a professor visit recently 
from Japan who said that she is discussing this report with her 
colleagues in Japan.  It has a lot of academics talking.  It has 
inspired people who work in law reform to start thinking about 
these ideas and incorporating them throughout the patent system. 
MR. RICHARDS: David, would you like to make some 
closing remarks, then Herb, and then if either of the government 
speakers want to say anything more? 
 
 244 See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, Executive Summary, at 7–8, 12–13 (discussing post-
grant review procedure in Recommendation #1 and adequate funding for the PTO in 
“Recommendation #4”). 
 245 See id. at Executive Summary, 17–18 (discussing the need to increase 
communication between antitrust agencies and patent institutions through the use of 
Amicus Briefs). 
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MR. BALTO: No.  Herb. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: I really don’t have much to say in closing.  
I think I’ve made my views fairly clear. 
I would say, going back to your comment about the NSF 
report, yes they do discuss a non-obvious standard, but they 
discuss it in a couple of very specific areas where there have been 
some issues, in business method patents and gene sequence 
patents.246  They do not suggest changing the statutory framework.  
They suggest a reasoned approach to try to work it out.247 
That is fundamentally different from what the FTC is doing in 
this area.  The FTC is, in effect, suggesting very specific changes 
in the basic ground rule of how obviousness should be 
determined.248  Such a change would be effected by either 
legislation or court decision, and my guess is presumably 
legislation, since I doubt that they will persuade the Federal Circuit 
to put in the changes they are suggesting by court decision.249 
Now, certainly they are entitled to take that position.  I don’t 
quarrel with their right to do it.  But to suggest that they are on the 
same page as the National Science Foundation is not fair. 
MR. RICHARDS: A note on obviousness.  As a practical 
matter, I prosecuted applications before the U.S., European, and 
Japanese patent offices, and I don’t find any glaring lack of rigor 
from the examiners I deal with in the U.S. Patent Office when 
raising issues of obviousness.  They seem to raise very similar 
issues to the Europeans and the Japanese, so we seem to effectively 
have a sort of worldwide standard on obviousness at the moment.  
I wonder whether it is in anybody’s interest for the United States to 
take a different view from the rest of the world. 
MR. RICHARDS: David, do you want to say anything? 
MR. BALTO: I think the important question is establishing this 
balance.  It is important to recognize that protecting intellectual 
property rights to create an incentive to innovate is the primary 
 
 246 See NAS REPORT, supra note 73, at ch. 4, pp. 87, 91. 
 247 See id. 
 248 See FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at Executive Summary, 9–11. 
 249 See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at Executive Summary, 10–12 . 
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concern.  But when a process starts to morph into people seeking 
out regulatory rights to engage in bargaining, that balance is 
broken.  That is what I think the FTC’s report suggests.  I think 
their suggestions are modest and appropriate. 
And don’t bet on the Federal Circuit not accepting the FTC’s 
point of view.  The FTC has a very effective amicus program in 
which they are often successful in convincing the appellate courts 
of the appropriate interpretation of both IP and antitrust law.250 
In fact, the linchpin to the Bristol-Myers case,251 where there 
were millions of dollars of consumer harm for every day that 
Bristol-Myers improperly extended its patentfor those people 
who think that there might not be some harm from the misuse of 
patentsthe key to the Bristol-Meyers case being successfully 
litigated, was an amicus brief filed by the Federal Trade 
Commission before the district court.252  So I wouldn’t place any 
bets whatsoever that the FTC is going to be ineffective in 
convincing the Federal Circuit. 
MR. RICHARDS: I want to thank everybody. 
MR. BYE: One final word? 
MR. RICHARDS: One final word. 
MR. BYE: Just one quick final remark. I want to thank you all 
for listening today.  I would encourage everyone to take the NSF 
report and take the FTC report and compare the two 
recommendations with respect to obviousness.253  You will see that 
we recommend that there should be no change in the statutory 
standard.  We think the standard is good as it exists. 
We do believe that, in certain contexts, the test has not been 
applied as well as it could, which is quite similar to what the 
 
 250 See generally R. Ted Cruz, Remarks before the Antitrust Section American Bar 
Association (Dec. 12, 2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/tcamicus. 
 251 In re Buspirone Patent and Antitrust Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 252 Brief of Amici Curiae The Federal Trade Commission, In re Buspirone Patent and 
Antitrust Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 1410), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/briefs/buspirone.pdf (last visited May 9, 2005). 
 253 Compare NAS REPORT, supra note 73, at 87–95 with FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at 
ch. 4, pp. 4–19. 
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National Academies say.  But I would just encourage you to go 
and compare them yourselves. 
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you to all of you for your interesting 
contributions, and thank you to the panel.  We are now adjourned. 
MS. SYBBLIS: I’d like to thank our moderator and our 
panelists for their participation today and their insightful comments 
on this dynamic area. 
We are now going to take a ten-minute coffee break.  There are 
refreshments in the Atrium.  Then we will return here for our 
second panel. 
Thank you. 
 
